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Abstract 
Countries across the globe have outwardly called for solutions to the 
destabilizing threat of cyberwarfare, noting how damning it can be to governments and 
citizens alike. Throughout history, states have come together after new international 
threats arise to negotiate some type of agreement or form an international institution to 
make sure that threat is mitigated. With the new-age peril of cyberwarfare, this has not 
been the case. If an issue poses such a pervasive threat to every person who has access 
to technology, arguably more far reaching than any physical war could ever be, why 
have states not cooperated to regulate cyberweapons in the way we would assume? In 
particular, my research tackles the following question: why do states cooperate on some 
security issues and not others? This paper employs a comparative analysis of traditional 
weapons of mass destruction to better understand what characteristics of certain 
weapons inhibit international cooperation. I find three situations that create obstacles to 
cooperation on security issues: a lack of understanding of a weapon’s consequences, a 
difficulty attributing an attack to a specific attacker, and when a weapon has a 
sufficiently high tactical value. Each of these situations create incentives for states to 
choose non-cooperation over cooperation. I recommend two steps that international 
decision makers can take to increase the probability of cooperation: methods for global 
information sharing to better understand the cyberweapons problem and promotion of 
an international norm against the use of unregulated cyberspace.  
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Section I – Introduction  
  
Although an intangible platform, cyberspace is the lifeline that wires this world. In 
2020, we are living on the edge of a technological frontier, and the horizon of 
possibilities is only expanding. The technology through which we access cyberspace has 
allowed our world to rapidly advance beyond what we thought was possible. With the 
technological advancement, barriers to access technology have all but disappeared. It is 
estimated that in 2019, there were 9.32 billion mobile phone connections1. This means 
that there are more than one billion more mobile device connections than there are 
people on Earth. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimated that 4.1 
billion people, or 53.6% of the world’s population, were using the internet in 20192. 
Cyberspace is everywhere, and most of the planet has taken advantage of it at some 
point in this past year. We now live in a global village. Stating that all places on earth 
are connected through cyberspace is no hyperbole.  
 However, despite all of the benefits that technological interconnectedness has 
brought to our planet, the potential risks it brings are tremendous. Throughout the past 
couple of decades, cyber threats have become more prevalent. Cyberspace is being 
harnessed by both private and public actors as a weapon. In 2010, the virus Stuxnet 
destabilized Iran’s nuclear program by shutting down machines that were used to 
enrich uranium. Six years later, Russian state-backed hacking groups launched an 
information warfare campaign to influence the outcome of the 2016 US Presidential 
Election. These are just two of the many examples of the mal-use of cyberspace to wreak 
havoc in another state’s affairs. On the more individual level, we can look to Cambridge 
                                               
1 “GSMA Intelligence.” Accessed December 3, 2019. https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/. 
2 “Statistics.” Accessed December 3, 2019. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx. 
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Analytica’s illegal harvesting of personal data from 87 million unsuspecting Facebook 
users. These three examples bring to the forefront the treacherous consequences of 
cyber-attacks that can harm both states and individuals alike. Cybersecurity poses a 
pervasive threat to every person who has access to technology, arguably more far 
reaching than any physical war could ever be. If you do not think that you are at risk of 
being a target of a cyberweapon, you are wrong.  
 Throughout history, states have come together after a crisis to negotiate some 
type of agreement or form an international institution to make sure that similar crises 
never happen again. There has been a plethora of cyberattacks in the past couple of 
decades. These include attacks on governments and government infrastructure such as 
Stuxnet and the US election hacking. These cases of cyberweapons being used to target 
states are emblematic of the potential of states to harness these weapons and use them 
against each other. Although this may not be considered a “crisis” yet, the possibilities 
and subsequent consequences are critical enough to cause alarm. States across the globe 
have outwardly called for solutions to the destabilizing threat of cyber warfare, noting 
how damning it can be to governments and the citizens within their borders. It is 
surprising, then, to hear that states have not come together to try and solve this issue 
like history would suggest. Besides the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs 
(UNODA) taking up research on the issue, there are few comparable attempts to 
cooperate on a global scale. A United Nations mandated working group, the Group of 
Governmental Experts (GGE) is mandated to advance responsible state behavior in 
cyberspace in the context of international security3. The group, created in 2013 failed to 
                                               
3 “UN GGE and OEWG | GIP Digital Watch Observatory for Internet Governance and Digital Policy.” Accessed October 8, 
2019. https://dig.watch/processes/un-gge. 
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come to a consensus on an outcome report, prompting the international community to 
call the event the “death of the GGE”4. 
 The failure of the GGE left a gaping hole in the international conversation on 
cybersecurity. This was particularly worrisome because cybersecurity is an issue that 
continues to become more of a threat every day. Technology advances at such a rapid 
rate, that if relevant actors are not keeping up with the efforts to mitigate the threat, it 
may run afoul. International non-cooperation leaves both people and states vulnerable 
to these destabilizing threats. Without an attempt to codify some type of regulation to 
outlaw the use of cyberspace as a weapon, both public and private actors have nothing 
holding them accountable. In 2019, the GGE was revived, along with an Open-Ended 
Working Group (OEWG) on cyberspace. This rebirth was precipitated by a world 
understanding of how dangerous a lack of cooperation can be.  
 Through my research, I aim to figure out why states have not cooperated in a 
deep a sustained manner - the way we assume would happen. To understand 
cooperation on cybersecurity, it is integral that I broaden the scope to international 
security and disarmament issues in general. Understanding why cooperation lends 
itself to security issues more broadly will allow me to critically analyze the specific case 
of cybersecurity more thoroughly. This view has prompted my research question: why 
do states cooperate on some security issues and not others? Once I can identify the 
relationship between cooperation and security issues, I can then provide an additional 
contribution to the conversation. By understanding where cooperation is strained, I can 
then propose solutions to remedy these issues. Policy proposals are integral in a field 
                                               
4 “The Year in Review: The Death of the UN GGE Process? | Council on Foreign Relations.” Accessed March 20, 2020. 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/year-review-death-un-gge-process. 
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that has few, but needs many. The sooner governments can act, the sooner we can make 
headway on protecting people from cyberweapons.  
 It only seems fitting that I take a non-traditional approach to this problem. Since 
there is relatively little discourse in political science on the intersection of cooperation 
and cybersecurity, I had the pleasure of piecing together different parts of the literature 
as a jumping off point for my project. I will attribute the relevant literature in Section II, 
and throughout my conceptualization and methodology. In Section III, I will detail my 
conceptualization. Since cyberspace is a non-traditional arena of war, the understanding 
of cyberspace as a cyberweapon is the most integral part of my paper. In Section IV, I 
will outline my methodology and provide justification for my research design. I employ 
a comparative analysis of four different types of international security and disarmament 
issues: nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and cyberweapons. I 
rely on process tracing and game theory to analyze my cases, and will argue at length 
why these are the best fit for my research design. My case studies appear in Section V. 
Section VI, the meatiest part of my thesis, will be where I provide evidence and do that 
actual task of process tracing for my hypotheses. Section VII will conclude my paper, 
report my findings, and propose next steps on the issue.  
  
The Hypotheses 
 
 For each hypothesis, I collect evidence to support “clues”.  For any given clue, I 
evaluate how much that tells me about the likelihood of the hypotheses being at play. 
Throughout my research, I continually ask the question: “what would we see in a world 
where this hypothesis holds true?” I propose these four hypotheses because I believe 
they are all at play in affecting cybersecurity cooperation. Each of the individual 
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hypotheses is tested as if we live in a world where that specific hypothesis holds true, 
barring consideration of the rest. However, when trying to answer my research 
question, it is important to analyze the overall levels of cooperation, taking all 
hypotheses into consideration. In the real world, all of these hypotheses could play a 
part in affecting cooperation. There could be a plethora of factors that I have not even 
considered.  
My four hypotheses are:  
1) As the consequences of a weapon become more understood or made tangible, 
cooperation becomes more likely  
2) As the attribution of violation becomes harder, cooperation becomes less likely 
3) When the benefit of the status quo is large enough, cooperation becomes less 
likely 
4) As the tactical value of a weapon increases, cooperation becomes less likely 
 For the hypotheses that I did not have enough information or understanding to 
test, I decided to focus on hypothesis generation. The value of hypothesis generation in 
this ongoing issue is tremendous, as it sets up the pins for the future political scientists 
to knock down when the world is in a place where we can better do that. I feel confident 
that we have enough information known to test hypotheses 1,2, and 4, and make a 
strong conjecture about their existence. I focus on generating theory and gathering 
initial evidence for Hypothesis 3.  I have found that there is enough evidence to support 
the existence of causal mechanisms in hypotheses 1,2, and 4. The strength of the clues I 
gather bolster the aforementioned proposed relationships between a cause, and the 
subsequent effect on state cooperation. In Section VII, I use each specific hypothesis, in 
conjunction with the others, to detail why we see more cooperation on traditional 
weapons of mass destruction than we do for cyberweapons.  
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Section II – Using the Literature  
  
The cybersecurity cooperation issue is relatively new to academia. The youngness of 
the cybersecurity issue means there has been little discourse compared to other security 
issues that have existed for much longer. A characteristic of the existing literature 
revolves around better understanding cybersecurity and identifying the issues that it 
poses for governance and cooperation. Bradshaw (2015) posits that cooperation on 
cybersecurity emerges when there is a high degree of trust and information sharing 
between actors5. However, she acknowledges that cybersecurity involves a plethora of 
different actors with varying preferences, which can hinder trust and information 
sharing. These are characteristics of a distribution problem, according to Koremenos 
(2016), which hinders cooperation6. Rueter (2014) also suggests that cooperation is being 
hindered by a lack of trust. This trust is inherent to the security dilemma: security-
seeking states may be uncertain about the intention of other states. He applies this 
framework to better understand the lack of cooperation with cyberweapons7. 
Chernenko, Demidov, and Lukyanov (2018) provided recommendations for 
jumpstarting international cooperation that include US - Russia dialogue, requiring 
state reports of cyber vulnerabilities, and reconvening the GGE. On a larger scale, they 
proposed the creation of international cyber law, an international cyber court, and a 
worldwide cyber convention8.  
                                               
5 Bradshaw, Samantha. “Combatting Cyber Threats: CSIRTs and Fostering International Cooperation on Cybersecurity,” n.d., 24. 
6 Koremenos, Barbara. The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316415832. 
7 Rueter, Nicholas C. “The Cybersecurity Dilemma,” 2011, 72. 
8 “Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms.” Russia in Global Affairs. Accessed April 
4, 2020. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/increasing-international-cooperation-in-cybersecurity-and-adapting-cyber-norms/. 
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 Rather than focusing on the proposed distribution problem, I am using a 
comparative analysis to broaden the conversation about cooperation. By understanding 
why cooperation lends itself to certain security issues more than others, I hope to plant 
a seed that will grow into a more in-depth conversation on how states can cooperate to 
mitigate cybersecurity risks. To make this contribution, I will be pulling from multiple 
literatures: the international law and cooperation literatures. The literature on these 
issues provides a strong framework for analyzing the cybersecurity problem. Using pre-
existing international law principles lends credence to my comparison of traditional 
weapons of mass destruction to cyberweapons. There is extensive international 
cooperation literature, which is the basis for understating why, when, and to what 
degree states cooperate on issues. These two international relations literature subclasses 
will help me defend my conceptualization.  
 To justify my methodology, I turn to the process tracing and game theory 
literature. Process tracing is used to analyze cause and effect, thus making it a strong 
guide as I work through causal relationships in international cooperation. The game 
theory literature includes a substantial body of work on using game theory as a 
metaphor, rather than a formal model, in understanding cooperation.  
 
Section III– Conceptualization 
  
I am conceptualizing the cybersecurity issue as an issue of cyberweapons. It is 
beneficial to look at cybersecurity as a weapons issue because international law has 
well-defined regulations of states’ use of weapons. There are two important prongs of 
my conceptualization. The first is the ability to apply international legal norms to 
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cyberweapons. There is currently no international cyberweapon law codified. However, 
I argue that in order to understand why that may be, we need to apply pre-existing 
international legal frameworks to the issue. The second prong justifies why we are 
allowed to do this in political science discourse. I argue that based on shared norms and 
characteristics, cyberweapons should be thought of as a weapon of mass destruction.  
 
Application of International Legal Norms  
 
International law has a well-defined framework for dealing with states’ use of 
weapons. Therefore, applying something concrete to an underdeveloped area will help 
me work through it. I argue that international legal frameworks can be applied to 
cyberweapons because these weapons are fundamentally the same as tangible weapons, 
which have been subject to international legal norms and customs for many decades. 
Looking towards international legal frameworks is a way to better understand potential 
cybersecurity cooperation. The solution to the problem at hand hinges on government 
cooperation, so relevant laws and institutions should be applied when considering the 
issue.  
 Arguably the most important piece of literature in this regard comes from the 
Group of Governmental Expert’s (GGE) 2013 meeting. The GGE is a United Nations 
(UN) mandated working group working in the field of information security. Their most 
notable achievement came in 2013 when they published a report linking international 
law to cyberspace9. In the report, the GGE stressed the need for cooperation among 
states to combat future cyber threats. The group then affirmed that the application of 
                                               
9 General Assembly resolution 68/98, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security  
 A/RES/68/98 (24 June 2013), available from undocs.org/A/68/98 
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relevant international law statutes and norms is an essential cooperative measure to 
reaching cyber threat elimination10. 
  Puyvelde and Brantly (2017) continue this method of analysis on a more 
theoretical level11. They look at the UN Charter for rules regarding war and aggression. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter says all members shall “refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state”12. But in Article 51, the Charter confirms the right to “individual or 
collective self-defense” in the face of armed attack13. The main takeaway from the 
Charter is that nation-states should refrain from aggression, but the use of force is 
appropriate in the face of an attack14. In terms of war, these existing guidelines apply to 
physical war and armed attacks, which have characterized the traditional arena of war 
throughout history. Cyberwar is not a physical war and has yet to translate into 
physical armed attacks. However, the “threat or use of force against… any state”15 can 
be understood as the reason behind many cyber-attacks. Cooperation hinges on the 
common understanding of international legal norms. Therefore, Puyvelde and Brantly 
propose that in order to be able to move forward with cybersecurity cooperation, states 
need to reinterpret the principles in the UN charter and apply them to cybersecurity16. 
The GGE and the OEWG reaffirmed the ability to apply the UN charter to cyberspace at 
their first 2019 session17.  
                                               
10 Ibid.  
11 Damien Van Puyvelde and Aaron Franklin Brantly, Cybersecurity: Politics, Governance and Conflict in 
Cyberspace (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017) 
12 U.N. Charter art. 2,¶ 4. 
13 Ibid. art. 51 
14 Damien Van Puyvelde and Aaron Franklin Brantly, Cybersecurity: Politics, Governance and Conflict in 
Cyberspace (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017) 
15 U.N. Charter art. 94,¶ 1. 
16 Damien Van Puyvelde and Aaron Franklin Brantly, Cybersecurity: Politics, Governance and Conflict in 
Cyberspace (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017) 
17 General Assembly resolution 68/98, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security  
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Rectifying the Difference Between Traditional Weapons and Cyberweapons 
 
 The key distinction between cyberweapons and traditional weapons is that the 
former is intangible, while the latter is physical. Beyond the intangibility of a weapon, 
cyberweapons are fundamentally the same as traditional weapons, which have been 
regulated under international disarmament law for decades. The 1868 St. Petersburg 
Conference was the catalyst for international disarmament cooperation. The main 
takeaway from the conference was that any weapon that caused useless enhancement of 
pain and suffering or unnecessary death is a violation of humanitarian principles. Thus, 
any such weapon should be outlawed18. Traditional weapons of mass destruction were 
outlawed under this principle. Cyberweapons have the capability to take on these 
characteristics, and with constant advancements of technology, the destructive 
capabilities are unknown. Threat assessments predict that the next major international 
crisis could realistically be a result of the weaponization of cyberspace19. This possibility 
warrants approaching cybersecurity as a disarmament issue.  
 We have seen essentially the same problem come up in history a couple of times 
before: a new type of weapon threatening the traditional arena of war appears. Like 
traditional weapons of mass destruction, cyberweapons function in a way that has not 
been seen in the field of war before. Once cyberweapons became known, relevant actors 
explored their implications on war, and more generally, society. The discoveries of the 
destructive capabilities of cyberweapons - namely their ability to remotely control a 
country’s infrastructure and steal private data, has led many to call for limitations on its 
use. Without limitations in the form of law, the weapon proliferated and evolved. 
                                               
 A/RES/68/98 (24 June 2013), available from undocs.org/A/68/98 
18 “1868 Saint Petersburg Declaration | Weapons Law Encyclopedia.” Accessed April 4, 2020. 
http://www.weaponslaw.org/instruments/1968-Saint-Petersburg-Declaration. 
19 “Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms.” Russia in Global Affairs. Accessed April 
4, 2020. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/increasing-international-cooperation-in-cybersecurity-and-adapting-cyber-norms/. 
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Throughout my case studies, namely Hypothesis 1, I will show how this process has 
mirrored that of traditional weapons of mass destruction.  
 The emergence of cyberspace as a new arena for war means we need to shift our 
mindset of disarmament to a more abstract interpretation. We do not fully understand 
the destructive capabilities of cyberweapons, and we should proceed with caution and a 
sense of urgency. With weapons of mass destruction, states came together to 
collectively disarm, or at least prohibit the use of weapons, due to their destructive 
capabilities. These sentiments exist within the realm of cyberweapons. States have the 
capabilities to harness cyberspace in the form of a dangerous weapon. These 
observations lead me to ask two questions: What can explain why cyberwarfare is 
systematically different from traditional weapons of mass destruction? Why are states 
not agreeing to collectively control or disarm a weapons proliferation? 
 
 
Section IV – Methodology  
 
 
Process Tracing 
 
To answer my research question, I have to gain insight into the nature of 
cooperation problems. This rather exploratory quest guided me to process tracing as a 
means of hypothesis testing rather than the analysis of hard data. Process tracing is the 
practice of tracing a process in order to find a causal mechanism through which the 
cause brings about the effect20. By carefully noting the trajectory of change, we can better 
understand what causal mechanism is in operation. For this paper, the effect is 
                                               
20 Collier, David. “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 04 (October 2011): 823–30. 
doi:10.1017/S1049096511001429. 
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cooperation on a security issue. I test my hypotheses by collecting clues that show if 
there exists a causal mechanism that has an effect on changing the degree of 
cooperation. Fairfield and Charman21 (2017) apply Bayesian analysis to process tracing 
that I find helpful for my paper. They argue that after assessing the weight of the 
evidence for each observation, we can infer the probability that a specific causal 
mechanism is causing the effect. There exists a rational degree of belief that we should 
have in a hypothesis in light of the information we have collected.  
 In a world where the hypothesis holds true, we would see certain clues. The 
existence of these clues holds a certain probative value, blind to the evidence that exists, 
that helps me assess the rational degree of belief. These probative values are as follows:  
(1) Low probative value à not sufficiently useful to prove we have reason to 
believe the hypothesis holds true  
(2) Probative value à sufficiently useful to prove we have reason to believe the 
hypothesis holds true  
(3) High probative value à sufficiently useful to prove we have strong reason to 
believe the hypothesis holds true  
I look for evidence in our world to show the existence of these clues. The supported 
existence of the clues allows me to evaluate the reasonable probability that the 
hypothesis holds true. The structure I use to trace this process is: presenting the 
hypothesis, presenting the clue(s), presenting the evidence for the clues, and then 
evaluating the probability that the hypothesis holds true. The evidence is labeled by 
“Clue number. Weapon type. Evidence number.” NW represents nuclear weapons, 
CW represents chemical weapon, BW represents biological weapon, and CY represents 
                                               
21 Fairfield, Tasha, and Andrew E. Charman. “Explicit Bayesian Analysis for Process Tracing: Guidelines, Opportunities, and 
Caveats.” Political Analysis 25, no. 3 (July 2017): 363–80. doi:10.1017/pan.2017.14. 
 
 
 
16 
 
cyberweapon. For example, nuclear weapon evidence piece 3 for clue two is stylized as 
“C2. NW. E3”. I do this for hypotheses 1 and 2. For Hypothesis 4, I use my own 
methodology, which is detailed in Appendix 1. 
Finding no evidence in a case study is a telling result in of itself. I use Philosopher  
John Stuart Mill’s method of difference to justify why a lack of evidence matters in 
understanding the degree of reasonability for the hypothesis. This method compares 
instances of effects and finds what they do not have in common. If there are factors that 
exist that lead to one outcome, and those factors do not exist and then lead to the 
opposite outcome, we can infer this factor is the cause22. The main limitation to this 
method is that it attempts to extrapolate a singular cause in order to explain the causal 
mechanism. I acknowledge that there may be a plethora of factors affecting the cause, 
thus I cannot use the method of difference to draw a decisive conclusion on its own. I 
rely on collecting sound evidence to support the existence of clues. The intuition behind 
Mill’s principle signals that when finding no evidence in a case study leads to the 
opposite outcome, we can use the resulting causal inference to supplement the evidence 
collected for the hypothesis.  
 
Case Studies 
  
I conduct a case study on traditional weapons of mass destruction (WMD). My three 
cases are nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. In order to find 
out why states have not yet cooperated on cyberweapons, it is necessary to look at 
security issues more broadly. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons were all 
technological advancements that threatened the traditional arena of war upon 
                                               
22 “[S05] Mill’s Methods.” Accessed April 4, 2020. https://philosophy.hku.hk/think/sci/mill.php. 
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inception. When each weapon came onto the scene of war at its respective time, there 
was uncertainty about the nature of the weapons and their consequences. Most, if not 
all, work on disarmament and protection measures had only been done for traditional 
weapons. This forced governments to think about different ways to solve these new age 
issues. We have seen the same thing happening with cyberweapons.  
By looking at the nature of cooperation in each of these issues, I can better 
hypothesize how security issues differ in cooperation problems. Through process 
tracing, I will be able to evaluate if certain causal mechanisms exist in different cases. 
These findings will better help me understand how cooperative obstacles can be 
overcome in cyberweapons. 
 
Game Theory  
 
I turn to game theory to better understand strategic interaction. I use the principles 
of cooperative games as a guide in evaluating when and where we see cooperation on 
security issues. I will use the mechanisms of a game to guide an analysis of the 
cooperation landscape today as if it were a cooperation game. Assumptions that the 
literatures hold true in a game theory analysis are that all players are rational decision 
makers according to the rational choice theory and that utility refers to some ranking of 
the subjective benefit that an actor receives from a set of objects or events. Rational 
decision makers choose strategies that aim to maximize their utility23.  
The players in this “game” are countries (international decision makers). Their pure 
strategies are “cooperate” and “do not cooperate”. As this is an analogy, we will assume 
                                               
23 Von Neumann, John, Oskar Morgenstern, and Ariel Rubinstein. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (60th Anniversary 
Commemorative Edition). Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1944. Accessed April 5, 2020. doi:10.2307/j.ctt1r2gkx. 
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there are no mixed strategies. The players’ payoffs are the utility they derive from either 
of their pure strategies. As utility maximizing rational agents, the players will choose 
whatever strategy maximizes their payoff. This is the framework we will use to 
understand the behavior of countries when it comes to international security and 
disarmament cooperation. Payoff structures are the list of outcomes that are assigned a 
utility. Payoffs are ranked based off of the welfare that the actor gets from the select 
strategy after all other players have selected their strategies. From there, we can better 
understand how countries derive utility. All of my hypotheses try to postulate how 
countries formulate payoff rankings and thus choose strategies. These strategies are 
observable after the cooperation “game” is over, and we know all players’ selections.  
A final assumption is necessary for this paper: utility is derived from a cost benefit 
analysis. I analyze cooperation in terms of incentives. The utility derived from a payoff 
incentivizes a strategy to be taken. Cost benefit analysis is the heart of incentives. This 
cost benefit analysis is woven into my process tracing, especially for Hypothesis 4. I 
build a case from a set of clues during my evidence gathering stage. I will assign the 
clues to be a cost or a benefit and then evaluate how they compound to create a net 
payoff. Here is the template of cost benefit analysis that I am going to use:  
1) Net payoff of cooperation > net payoff of non-cooperation —> more likely to 
cooperate  
1) Net payoff of cooperation < net payoff of non-cooperation —> less likely to 
cooperate 
Note that I say less/more likely to cooperate rather than will/will not cooperate. I 
use this analysis on individual hypotheses as a means of process tracing. However, 
these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and there are too many uncertain variables 
in the world to make an unqualified statement.  
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Section V – Case Studies  
 
I have chosen the traditional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as my case 
studies. The appearance of cyberweapons on the scene makes these three WMDs seem 
traditional, but there was nothing conventional about nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons when they first proliferated. At each of their respective beginnings, these new 
types of weapons disturbed the status quo of warfare. This unprecedented entry of each 
new type of weapon forced the international community to cooperate to better 
understand the threat, and subsequently agree to disarm. It is important to 
contextualize cooperation with the history of how the arrival of a new weapon into the 
arena of war forced the world to create a cooperative outcome.  
 
Nuclear Weapons: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the main 
international agreement regulating the use of nuclear weapons. It is the only ratified 
agreement regulating the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons24. The NPT was 
precipitated by a changing international taboo against the use of nuclear weapons25. The 
use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki signaled the dangers of nuclear 
weapon proliferation. During the Cold War, the non-use of nuclear weapons rested on 
the existence of mutually assured destruction (MAD). However, this was fragile, and 
was threatened by an increase of tensions between the US and the USSR. The fear of a 
nuclear world war was increased by the reality that even more countries would obtain 
                                               
24 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was adopted in 1996, but has yet to be ratified.  
25 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - Main Page.” Accessed February 17, 2020. 
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/tnpt/tnpt.html#. 
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nuclear weapons if nothing was done to stop them. This spurred an anti-nuclear 
rhetoric that seeped into the international discourse26. 
On 8 December 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his “Atoms of 
Peace” speech to the UN General Assembly. In this speech, Eisenhower admitted that 
the “dread secret” of atomic weapons no longer belonged solely to the US. During 
World War II, the US was the only known stockpiler of nuclear weapons, with the two 
atomic bombs27. Eisenhower warned that the knowledge of nuclear weapons was 
spreading throughout the world, which warranted international concern. After 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world began to realize the infinitely destructive 
capabilities of nuclear energy, but also the potential for it to be infinitely helpful. 
Eisenhower called for the creation of an international atomic energy agency that would 
control the stockpiles of uranium and other fissionable materials. This agency would 
also carry out safeguards to promote the sharing of materials and information needed 
to conduct peaceful nuclear energy research28.  During this time, there were both 
domestic and regional agreements on such topics, but the need for an international 
agency was seen as the primary way to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons29.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) statute was approved in 1956 and 
entered into force in 1957 after negotiations precipitated by the US and the UN. Its main 
objective is to ensure that nuclear activities were being used for peaceful and not 
military purposes. However, the inability of the USSR and the US to cooperate on 
halting their nuclear arms race at the height of the Cold War rendered the IAEA unable 
to fully execute its functions. In 1960 and 1964 respectively, France and China started 
                                               
26 Ibid.  
27 “Atoms for Peace Speech.” Text. IAEA, July 16, 2014. https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Putte, D Vande. “International Atomic Energy Agency: Personal Reflections.” Annals of Nuclear Energy 25, no. 10 (June 
1998): 791. doi:10.1016/S0306-4549(97)00121-7. 
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nuclear stockpiles. This proliferation, coupled with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, 
heightened the need for legally binding safeguards against nuclear proliferation30. The 
NPT went into effect in 1970, thirteen years after the creation of the IAEA.  Here is the 
timeline of the international cooperation that lead to the NPT31.32: 
-29 July 1957: The IAEA enters into force as an international organization 
independent of the UN to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy.  
-17 October 1958: Nuclear non-proliferation is first introduced as a topic that 
warranted serious consideration at the 13th session of the General Assembly in a draft 
resolution in the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC, First 
Committee).  
-September 1959:  Nuclear-nonproliferation is considered on the agenda of the 14th 
session of the General Assembly on recommendation from the First Committee.  
-20 November 1959: The General Assembly adopts Resolution 1380, which suggests 
the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) consider appropriate means to avert 
the danger of nuclear weapon proliferation. The TNDC consisted of European 
countries, the USSR, and the US.  
-15 March - 28 June 1960: The TNDC meets but does not actually discuss nuclear 
non-proliferation despite recommendation from the General Assembly  
-20 December 1960: General Assembly adopts Resolution 1578 at its 15th session, 
which enforces the need for a permanent agreement to stop the spread of nuclear 
                                               
30 Ibid.  
31 The entirety of the following timeline comes from the United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law’s NPT 
Procedural History page (citation in footnote 31) 
32 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - Main Page.” Accessed March 20, 2020. 
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/tnpt/tnpt.html. 
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weapons. The necessity for a better understanding of nuclear proliferation implications 
is heavily promoted by the General Assembly and DISEC during this session.  
-4 December 1961: The General Assembly adopts Resolution 1664 which requests 
the Secretary-General to make an inquiry regarding the conditions under which non-
nuclear weapon states would be willing to enter into an agreement to refrain from 
acquiring and manufacturing nuclear weapons.  
-20 December 1961: The General Assembly resolution 1722 establishes the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the successor of the TNDC, established by 
the USA and the USSR to negotiate “general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control”.  
-15 March and 18 April 1962: The USSR and US respectively present the first draft 
treaties on general disarmament, which includes articles on nuclear non-proliferation.  
-10 October 1964: Nuclear non-proliferation as a specific topic is added onto the 
General Assembly’s agenda for the first time. Before the 19th session, the General 
Assembly and the ENDC debated nuclear non-proliferation in the more general 
discussions on disarmament.  
-17 August and 24 September 1965: The ENDC meets during the General 
Assembly’s 20th session and the US and USSR respectively introduce the first draft treaty 
on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons  
-4 November 1966: The General Assembly adopts Resolution 2149, which appealed 
to all states to take steps to achieve the earliest possible time for the conclusion of a 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It also called for a cessation all activities that would be 
conducive to proliferation.  
-24 August 1967: The USSR and the US submit separate but identical draft treaties 
on nuclear non-proliferation.  
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-11 March 1968: The USSR and the US submit a joint draft treaty during an ENDC 
conference.  
-12 June 1968: The General Assembly revises the draft treaty and adopts resolution 
2373, in which it commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) and requested the Depository Governments open the treaty for signing.  
-1 July 1968: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened 
for signature in Moscow, USSR, London, UK, and Washington D.C., US.  
-5 March 1970: The Treaty enters into force after 40 states and the Depository 
Governments signed.  
-1995: At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the Treaty was voted to extend 
indefinitely. 
The treaty focuses on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the disarmament of 
nuclear weapons, and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT 
recognizes the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China as confirmed nuclear weapon 
states. The NPT entrusts the IAEA as the inspectorate for ensuring compliance with its 
non-proliferation and disarmament clauses33. The IAEA has two-fold responsibilities: 
the first is verification of no deviations from peaceful nuclear energy activities for non-
nuclear weapon states. The other is verification of the accuracy of activity reports from 
confirmed nuclear weapon states34. The verification of accuracy and non-deviation are 
how the IAEA monitors compliance with the NPT. The NPT also contains duration 
provisions in Article X35. The duration of the NPT will be reviewed every 25 years, with 
overall reviews every five years. In 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. The 
                                               
33 “Background Information.” UNODA Meetings Place. Accessed March 13, 2020. https://meetings.unoda.org/section/conf-npt-
2020-background-inf/. 
34 “Safeguards Agreements.” Text. IAEA, June 8, 2016. https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-agreements. 
35 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA.” Accessed April 4, 2020. 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/. 
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review conferences allow for additional measures to be approved in order to strengthen 
the NPT, learn about, and adapt non-proliferation measures to the changes in both the 
state of the world and advancing nuclear technology36. 
There has been success in stopping nuclear proliferation. At its height in 1986, the 
world nuclear stockpile totaled about 64,500. The USSR stockpiled 40,159 and the US 
had 23,317 warheads. After the disbanding of the USSR, tensions eased and states began 
destroying or retiring their nuclear stockpiles37. Currently, there are estimated to be 
around 14,000 nuclear warheads stockpiled. More than 90% of those belong to the US 
and Russia38. The IAEA has facilitated this downward trend, and continues to monitor 
both confirmed weapon states and non-weapon states for compliance. Even though the 
NPT is mostly successful in disarmament, it is criticized for its inability to fully promote 
non-proliferation. Iran is a member of the NPT, but was found in non-compliance by 
the IAEA in 2009. The IAEA found evidence of Iran’s nuclear program prior to 2003, but 
deemed there were no weaponization activities post 200939. North Korea acceded to the 
treaty in 1985, but withdrew in 2003. In 2005, North Korea announced the existence of 
its nuclear weapon program40. There are other non-signatories that possess nuclear 
weapons and do not fall under NPT regulations. India, Pakistan, and Israel are not 
currently state parties to the NPT. India and Pakistan have publicly announced the 
existence of their nuclear weapon programs. Israel is generally believed to have nuclear 
weapons, but commits to a policy of ambiguity41. There are an estimated 420 nuclear 
                                               
36 “Background Information.” UNODA Meetings Place. Accessed March 13, 2020. https://meetings.unoda.org/section/conf-npt-
2020-background-inf/. 
37 “Status of World Nuclear Forces.” Federation Of American Scientists. Accessed January 21, 2020. 
https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/. 
38 “SIPRI Yearbook 2019, Summary,” n.d., 24. 
39 “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance | Arms Control Association.” Accessed January 21, 2020. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat. 
40 “Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards.” Text. IAEA, July 25, 2014. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-
sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards. 
41 “SIPRI Yearbook 2019, Summary,” n.d., 24. 
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warheads stockpiled by the non-NPT states. Due to uncertainty about the state of the 
world and the inability of the NPT to regulate all nuclear weapon states, the threat of 
nuclear war still remains.  
 
Chemical Weapons: The Chemical Weapons Convention  
 
Use of chemical weapons has been recorded as far back as 600 BCE. Up until World 
War I, they were used sparingly, and were not common to war. Their modern-day 
proliferation is largely credited to Fritz Haber, a German scientist, who weaponized 
chemical gasses for Germany to use in World War I42. The Germans carried out the first 
major chemical weapons attack with Chlorine gas on 22 April 1915 against the French 
and Algerian Forces in Belgium. The Germans thought they were going to change the 
course of the war by breaking stalemates in trench warfare43. But, by September 1915, the 
Allied forces had also started using chemical weapons. In 1916, chemical weapons 
became standard use on both sides, and each side started developing masks to combat 
its effects44. Three main types of chemical weapons were introduced during the War: 
asphyxiants, blistering agents and blood agents. 124,200 tons of these chemical agents 
were deployed by both sides. 90,000 soldiers suffered painful deaths, and close to a 
million more people were left blind, disfigured, or with debilitating injuries, pain, and 
suffering45.  
Public outrage at the unnecessary suffering caused by chemical weapons lead to the 
creation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Geneva Protocol banned the use of 
                                               
42 “A Brief History of Chemical War.” Science History Institute, May 11, 2015. https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/a-
brief-history-of-chemical-war. 
43 Ibid.  
44 “Gas in The Great War.” Accessed February 18, 2020. http://www.kumc.edu/wwi/medicine/gas-in-the-great-war.html. 
45 Ibid.  
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chemical weapons, but after World War I, world powers still ramped up development 
of chemical weapons. The USSR, the US, Japan, Germany, Italy, and the UK all heavily 
stockpiled old and new chemical weapons46. At the beginning of World War II, there 
was international panic that stronger and more devastating chemical weapons would 
be used. The world began to brace for it, but it never actually happened. Historians 
have many theories as to why, but the prevailing theory is that parity in chemical 
weapon stockpiling acted as a form of deterrence47. After the War, the tensions of the 
Cold War spurred more research and development of chemical weapons. It was seen as 
a viable option given nuclear deterrence. Although chemical weapons acted as a 
deterrence, they continued to proliferate and did not receive due consideration again 
until 1966, mostly because of overwhelming concern about nuclear weapons. In the 
1960s and 1970s, Vietnam and Yemen were suspected of using chemical weapons 
provided by the USSR48. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used mustard gas against Iran’s 
forces and Iraqi Kurds who were backed by the Iranians. The most infamous use of 
chemical weapons was the deployment of toxic herbicide Agent Orange by the US on 
Vietnam. Agent Orange was sprayed on the jungles of Vietnam in order to destroy the 
area where food was grown for the Guerrillas. The forest was effectively rendered 
useless for food production, which consequently triggered a famine for local civilian 
populations49. The UK also used toxic herbicides against Malaysia around this time50.  
International opinion against chemical weapons spurred negotiations that 
culminated in The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
                                               
46 Edward M. Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons (London: Reaktion, 2010)) 
47 Ibid.   
48 Ibid.  
49 “Agent Orange | Definition, Effects, & Victims | Britannica.” Accessed April 4, 2020. 
https://www.britannica.com/science/Agent-Orange. 
50 Edward M. Spiers, A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons (London: Reaktion, 2010)) 
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Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, known as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It opened for signature in 1993 and entered into 
force in 1997: seventy-two years after the Original Geneva Protocol. Given the high level 
of public outrage against chemical weapons that started in the late 1800s, it is surprising 
that reaching an agreement took so long. To better understand this, it is important to 
look at the timeline of negotiations51,52: 
-5 December 1966: The General Assembly passes Resolution 2162 B, which calls for 
adherence to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Assembly delegates the task of constructing 
an agreement on chemical weapon disarmament to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament (ENDC). At this time, chemical and biological weapons were considered 
under the same topic.  
-26 August 1969: The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 
formerly the ENDC, was expanded to 26 countries. The CCD reiterates the need for 
urgent consideration on the topic.  
-16 December 1971: With the creation of the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
General Assembly Urged the CCD to treat chemical weapons as a separate topic and to 
continue working towards an agreement.  
-1972-1978: Chemical weapons were on the General Assembly’s agenda every year, 
continuously reiterating the importance of a disarmament agreement, but not making 
substantial progress on an agreement.  
-1978: The General Assembly establishes a Disarmament Commission, a subsidiary 
organ of the Assembly, that reports to a new Committee on Disarmament. The 
                                               
51 The entirety of the following timeline comes from the United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law’s CWC 
Procedural History page (citation in footnote 51) 
52 “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction - Main Page.” Accessed April 4, 2020. https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpdpsucw/cpdpsucw.html. 
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commission is tasked with creating a comprehensive programme for chemical weapon 
disarmament.  
-17 March 1980: The Committee on Disarmament creates an Ad-Hoc Working 
Group for the duration of the 1980 session to examine and define the issues to be dealt 
with in negotiations. The Working group is revived every successive session until 1992.  
-8 July 1980: The US and the USSR introduce a joint progress report on their bilateral 
negotiations on chemical weapons disarmament.  
-1985: The US and the USSR resume their bilateral negotiations after a five-year 
hiatus.  
-15 December 1989: The Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 
1925 Geneva Protocol (Paris Conference) reaffirms the authority of the Protocol and 
calls on the Conference of Disarmament (renaming of the Committee on Disarmament) 
to achieve the conclusion of an agreement as soon as possible.  
-18-22 September 1989: At the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical 
Weapons, government and chemical industry representatives declares their 
commitment to cooperate together to support a disarmament agreement.  
-1 June 1990: The US and the USSR sign a bilateral agreement and commit to 
cooperate on creating technology to destroy chemical weapons safely, abstaining from 
producing chemical weapons, and reducing existing stockpiles.  
-20 June 1990: The Ad-Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons expands its mandate 
to include the “use of chemical weapons” in the scope of prohibition. Under the new 
mandate, the intensity of negotiations increases.  
-3 September 1992: The Conference on Disarmament adopts The Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
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and on Their Destruction (CWC) as well as the commission for the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). 
-13 January 1993: The Secretary General, the depository for the agreement, opens the 
CWC for signature in Paris, France.   
-29 April 1997: The Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force after Hungary, 
the 65th county to ratify, submitted its ratification notice. 
The CWC was groundbreaking in that it was the first treaty to completely ban the 
development, stockpiling, and use of a weapon. This posed a major problem for states: 
how do you write a treaty comprehensive enough to completely ban an entire category 
of WMD? The CWC’s predecessors, the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons 
Convention both have limited scope and a lack of verification measures. These fallacies 
in both did not deter the use of the weapon and each had multiple violations. States 
parties to the CWC wanted to make sure these two problems were solved through the 
institutional design of the agreement. In order to do so, a verification mechanism had to 
be created that was extremely thorough so to ensure total compliance, but not too 
intrusive. The majority of the negotiation period for the CWC was spent figuring out 
how to overcome issues that this presented. Here are three main problems that plagued 
the CWC negotiations:  
The Dual Nature of Chemicals53 
There were concerns that the chemical industry would divert the purpose of 
chemicals from peaceful to military. This proposed a challenge, since the private sector 
could not be a party to the treaty. Therefore, success of the treaty relied on cooperation 
between governments and the chemical industry. The chemical industry pushed back at 
                                               
53 Thakur, Ramesh and Chandan, Tejal (2006). The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation, Challenges and 
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the proposed inspection methods, as they saw the agreement as invading their 
commercial privacy and increasing the possibility of “bad press” for being associated 
with chemical weapons. These concerns were addressed at the 1989 Government -
Industry conference.  
Assurance of a Global Ban on Chemical Weapons54   
Many feared that the CWC would not be comprehensive enough to facilitate total 
world disarmament. Many states were hesitant to disarm, in the event that other states 
would continue their chemical weapon programs in secret. Many of these states wanted 
to retain the use of chemical weapons for retaliation purpose. There was also concern 
about chemical weapons proliferating outside of the East-West bloc, where they were 
mainly stockpiled. This fear was precipitated by reports of chemical weapon use in Asia 
and Africa. These states had an incentive to acquire chemical weapons to close the 
power gap with nuclear weapon states.  
The Political Landscape at the Time55  
The attempts to codify a disarmament treaty overlapped with the Cold War. East-
West tensions accelerated a chemical weapons arm race. Thus, encouraging the 
development and stockpiling of new, more dangerous chemical weapons. This political 
landscape was not conducive for a total disarmament treaty and stretched out the 
duration of negotiations.  
To overcome these problems, states expanded the scope of what the CWC covers 
and included extremely thorough verification and compliance mechanism. Article II of 
the CWC expands the definition of a chemical weapon to include its components plus 
the equipment needed to make a chemical weapon, rather than the final product. The 
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criteria for a chemical being classified as a weapon was changed from the degree of 
toxicity to its intended purpose. Any toxic or precursor chemical defaults as a weapon, 
unless it is being developed or produced for purposes that are not prohibited and the 
quantities and types are consistent with such purposes. Expanding the scope of what is 
considered a chemical weapon allows for easier facilitation of a total weapons ban56.  
The CWC created the OPCW, which is in charge of administering the verification 
and compliance mechanisms. The OPCW’s two main principles are to conduct 
verification in the least intrusive manner possible, and to use advances in science and 
technology to increase the effectiveness of verification57. Overall, it is considered the fact-
finding, consultation, and cooperation forum for states parties. The OPCW is made up 
of three bodies: The Technical Secretariat, the Executive Council, and the Conference of 
the States Parties. The Technical Secretariat administers the verification system58. The 
Executive Council consists of forty-one-member states who are elected every two years. 
The Council mainly oversees the Technical Secretariat and issues measures regarding 
non-compliance59. The Conference of the States Parties is the plenary organ of the OPCW 
and oversees implementation of the CWC60.  
The OPCW carries out the verification and compliance mechanism. Here are its 
main features: 
Verification of Destruction61 
Declarations on chemical weapon stockpiles, live and abandon production facilities, 
relevant chemical activities, national implementation strategies and related matters are 
                                               
56 “Chemical Weapons Convention.” OPCW. Accessed April 4, 2020. https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention. 
57 “History” OPCW. https://www.opcw.org/about-us/history. 
58 “Technical Secretariat.” OPCW. https://www.opcw.org/about-us/technical-secretariat. 
59 “Executive Council.” OPCW. https://www.opcw.org/about-us/executive-council. 
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required of states by the OPCW. The verification of destruction relies on verifying the 
correctness of these reports. Declared sites and facilities are subject to regular 
inspections by the Technical Secretariat. 
Verification of Non-Diversion62 
The OPCW has a record of chemicals that have the potential for diversion from 
peaceful to military uses. Governments must have knowledge of all sites where these 
chemicals are being handled, and report these declarations on a balance sheet. 
Verification of non-diversion relies on verifying the correctness of these records.  
Challenge Inspections63 
If a state has doubts about another state party’s compliance, it may ask for 
clarification or request an on-site challenge inspection at the location of doubtful 
activities. This closes routine verification loopholes, which are limited to declared 
facilities.  
Dispute Settlement64  
If inspections reveal non-compliance, the Technical Secretariat brings the case before 
the Executive Council or the Council of the States Parties. The Council can decide to 
take enforcement measures, or bring the case before the UN Security Council to decide 
on punishment. There exists a traditional inter-state dispute settlement process.  
According to Koremenos (2016), the existence of enforcement problems increases the 
incentive to defect65. In order to correct that problem, punishment provisions are 
incorporated into institutional design. The inclusion of punishment provisions 
decreases the payoff from defecting on an agreement by threatening severe sanctions on 
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defectors. Punishment provisions are also incorporated into institutional design when 
there exists uncertainty about future behavior. With chemical weapons, states vocalized 
their desire to stockpile for retaliation purposes. Thus, there was uncertainty that states 
would not continue to develop chemical weapons in secret. This uncertainty also 
necessitated the addition of a monitoring provision in the CWC. The CWC delegates 
monitoring to the OPWC because there are large incentives to defect and cheat on self-
reports, the alternative form to third-party monitoring. The existence of formal 
punishment provisions in the CWC, in conjunction with rigorous monitoring methods, 
deters defection and incentivizes long and robust cooperation.  
The institutional design of the CWC allowed it to be successful. The system of 
declarations and verifications has proven effective. The one place where the CWC has 
not performed as intended is the timeline for destruction of chemical weapon 
stockpiles. Destruction is difficult, and technology has not been developed to 
implement safe and effective chemical weapon destruction on a large scale. Destruction 
of stockpiles is still ongoing, but is behind schedule in many parts of the world. Despite 
the existence of the CWC, chemical weapons are still a threat, albeit a different 
permutation. Chemical terrorism has become a worry, especially after the UN 
attributed chemical weapons use to ISIS in Syria66. Non-state actors are unable to be 
parties to the Convention, which means there will always be a chance that chemical 
weapon use will go unregulated. The CWC was written in a way that makes it flexible 
to the changing times, and states parties have been working to do such at each of the 
review conferences.  
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Biological Weapons: The Biological Weapons Convention 
 
Biological weapons are complex systems that disseminate disease-causing 
organisms or toxins to harm or kill humans, animals or plants67. Biological weapons 
have been used in warfare for centuries. Human bodies that were infected with diseases 
were used to poison enemies’ water supplies and even catapulted over city walls to 
spread infectious diseases. The modern-day use of biological weapons started after the 
foundation of microbiology68. The knowledge gained through the study of 
microorganisms helped form modern medicine, but it also laid out the roadmaps to 
weaponize organisms. Once this byproduct of scientific discovery was realized, the 1874 
Brussels Declaration and the 1899 Hague Declaration prohibited the use of poisonous 
weapons. Additionally, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawed the development, 
stockpiling, and use of Biological weapons and toxins. However, these did nothing to 
deter the development and use of biological weapons. The first modern use of 
biological weapons was during World War I by the Germans. German forces attempted 
to infect livestock that was being sent to Great Britain with Anthrax and Glanders. 
These two pathogens infect animals first, and then infect humans when they come into 
contact with infected animals69,70.  
These attacks were not successful, but it signaled both the strategic value of such 
weapon, and its potential consequences to other countries. Many of the world powers 
began to invest in biological weapons to give them an edge in light of the post-war 
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tensions. No biological weapons were used again until World War II, but were 
developed and advanced in secret71. Japan had the largest biological weapons program 
post first world war. Shiro Ishii, considered the father of biological weapons, created 
Japan’s extensive program. Japan developed bio-weapons to aid their imperialistic 
goals. The program developed and stockpiled tens of thousands of bio-weapons, and 
killed thousands of humans in human trials. Most of these victims were Chinese, the 
main recipient of Japans’ bio-weapon attacks during World War II. During the War, 
Japan poisoned Chinese water wells with cholera and typhus, dropped disease infected 
insects onto rice fields and trade routes, and sprayed toxic gases down on villages72. 
Tens of thousands of Chinese were killed by Japanese bio-weapons during the war, and 
more died after. In 1947, two years after Japan surrendered, 30,000 people died due to 
complications from biological toxin exposure73. Biological weapons mimic diseases 
which have long-term health implications, and also destroy societal infrastructure.  
Japan was the only country to use biological weapons during the second world war. 
There was fear that Germany would use biological weapons. Their attempted use of 
anthrax during World War I and their continued development and stockpiling of bio-
weapons was well known by Allied forces. This fear sparked investment in bio-
weapons programs in France, the UK, and the US74. Germany never used them, though, 
and historians attribute it to a nasty consequence of biological warfare: pathogens do 
not respect borders. Germany is located in the middle of Europe, so any attack could 
have backfired and infected its own people. After World War II, countries continued 
their bio-weapons programs. The US, USSR, Japan, Germany, UK, and France all 
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continued their biological weapons programs. During this time, advancements in 
bioweapons created more types of dangerous toxins such as Brucellosis and Gas 
Gangrene. States also perfected how to turn infectious diseases such as typhoid, cholera, 
tetanus, small pox, tuberculosis, and tularemia into ammunition. Weaponization of 
bacteria related to food poisoning such as salmonella and clostridium botulinum, with 
an intent to incapacitate rather than kill, proliferated75.  
Biological weapons have been the ire of public opinion since the late 1800s. 
However, a disarmament treaty was not considered until the late 1960s. The 
negotiations on the Biological Weapons Convention only lasted less than three years. At 
the time of negotiation, biological and chemical weapons were debated as one topic. 
However, the UK’s draft convention proposed that the topics should be thought of as 
separate. Biologicals weapons were not used in conventional warfare as frequently as 
chemical weapons. Chemical weapons posed a larger problem due to their frequent use 
in World War I, and their use as deterrence. The UK, backed by the US, argued that an 
agreement on biological weapons should not be delayed just because an agreement on 
chemical weapons could not be reached76. On 25 November 1969, US president Richard 
Nixon halted America’s bioweapons program. This set an international precedence, and 
countries such as Canada, the UK, and Sweden followed suit. In 1971, the USSR and its 
allies came around to the view that biological weapons could be dealt with separately. 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological 
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Weapons Convention, BWC) was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 
1975. Here is a timeline on the cooperation behind the BWC77,78: 
-1966: Hungary submits a draft resolution in the First Committee that seeks to 
demand strict and absolute compliance by all states with the principles and norms 
established by the Geneva Protocol. 
-5 December 1966: The General Assembly adopts resolution 2162 B (XXI) that tasks 
the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) to seek an 
agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and 
biological weapons.  
-1 July 1969: A report from the Secretary-General, prepared by experts in the field, 
concludes that the prospects for complete disarmament would brighten if the 
development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons would 
end and they would be eliminated from all military arsenals.  
-10 July 1969: The UK submits a draft convention for the prohibition of biological 
warfare to the CCD (Conference of the Committee on Disarmament).  
-9 September 1969: Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR submit a draft 
convention for the prohibition of biological warfare to the General Assembly.  
-1971: The CCD decides that agreements on biological weapons and chemical 
weapons will be decided as two different topics due to the fact that there were already 
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two draft conventions submitted on biological weapons alone, and that chemical 
weapons would need more time to discuss.  
-16 December 1971: The General Assembly adopts resolution 2826 (XXVI) that 
accepts the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
(Biological Weapons Convention, BWC). 
-10 April 1972: The BWC opened for signature by the USSR, the UK, and the US, the 
depository governments.  
-26 March 1975: The BWC enters into force after ratification from 22 states including 
the three depository governments.  
The scope of the BWC’s prohibitions are very limited. Nowhere in the text does it 
explicitly ban the use of biological weapons. Article I prohibits the “development, 
production, and stockpile of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins… that have 
no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes and weapons, 
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict”79. Articles V and VI constitute a quasi-monitoring system. 
Article V mandates that states parties undertake consultation and cooperation with one 
another when any problems arise in the implementation of the convention. Article VI 
gives states parties the ability to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council if it 
believes another state is breaching their obligations. The Security Council has the power 
to investigate that country without interference or refusal. Article XII mandates review 
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conference every five years and Article XIII gives the convention an unlimited 
duration80.  
The BWC is extensively criticized for its lack of a verification system. The 
convention outlines no formal way to ensure that states are not cheating on the 
agreement. This is a problem, especially because it is easy to proliferate these weapons 
in secret. There is no monitoring provision to make sure that peaceful research using 
biological agents is not being diverted. The only verification methods are in Article V. 
The only form of accountability is the ability to file a complaint with the Security 
Council, which has never been invoked, although accusations against countries for 
suspected bioweapons programs have been publicly levied. A problem with this type of 
monitoring system is that the US, China, France, the UK, and Russia all have veto 
power on the Security Council, which applies to any BWC investigations. There have 
been flagrant violations of the BWC, proven by the existence of the USSR and Iraq’s 
admitted bio-weapons programs after the BWC’s ratification. Syria, Iran, North Korea, 
and Libya have all been accused of violation BWC obligations, but those claims have 
not been substantiated81.  
Another fallacy of the BWC is that it cannot regulate the use of bio-weapons by non-
state actors, since these actors cannot be parties to the convention. Biological weapons 
have been hailed the “poor man’s atomic bomb” because they are easy and cheap to 
make. Any extremist or terrorist group can easily access bio-agents or toxins for 
weaponization if they have enough determination82. This fallacy has posed problems for 
the complete disarmament of biological weapons on several occasions. In 1984, the 
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Rajneesh religious group weaponized salmonella and poisoned 751 people in order to 
influence a local election in Oregon. In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult used Sarin gas to 
kill twelve train passengers and injure more than 5,000 in Japan’s subway system. In 
2001, an unidentified assailant killed five people by sending letters contaminated with 
anthrax spores to prominent American political and media figures83. At every review 
conference of the BWC, states parties work to address these shortcomings. Currently, 
the states parties to the BWC are pushing for a more stringent verification system. 
However, there have not been substantial confidence building measures that 
adequately address these shortcomings of the BWC. 
 
Section VI – Hypothesis Testing 
 
In this section, I use process tracing to test hypotheses 1,2, and 4. For these 
hypotheses, I evaluate the existence of evidence to support clues. I then assess the 
degree of reasonability that we can believe these hypotheses hold true based on the 
existence of these clues. For Hypothesis 4, see Appendix 1 for an extended look at my 
methodology. For hypotheses 3, I provide justifications for why this hypothesis should 
be tested in the future, when there is more information available.  
 
Hypothesis 1: As consequences become more understood and made 
tangible, cooperation becomes more likely 
 
I hypothesize that as the consequences of a weapon become more understood 
and made tangible, cooperation becomes more likely. The main distinction between 
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traditional weapons of mass destruction and cyberweapons is that the former is 
tangible, while the latter operates in an intangible, abstract dimension. This hypothesis 
attempts to connect the tangibility of a weapon’s consequences with cooperation. A less 
tangible consequence is one that actors have yet to understand to its full extent and also 
cannot be easily observed or defined. Consequences often drive cooperation - states 
agree to disarm to avoid consequences of a particular event. This relationship between 
understanding consequences and cooperation is evident in the realm of infectious 
diseases and climate change. I look at these two case studies to better understand this 
causal mechanism.  
 
Infectious Diseases 
Infectious diseases were one of the first issues that nations realized could not be 
solved without international cooperation84. Due to globalization, infections have the 
ability to threaten populations across the world. Beyond the effect on human health, 
they can dismantle the ties that connect our world such as global economies. Cholera, 
plague, and yellow fever were three global pandemics in the 19th century that affected 
multiple continents. Cholera, specifically was the most dangerous: it is estimated that 
hundreds of thousands of people died across the globe during the Cholera outbreaks of 
the mid 19th century85.  
At the time, individual countries were dealing with the Cholera outbreak on 
their own by quarantining infected people within the country. However, as 
globalization took off, the disease crossed borders and destabilized economies that were 
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now interconnected through global trade and finance. As a response, nations came 
together for the International Sanitary Conference in 1851. This started a series of 14 
conferences that addressed international cooperation on the containment of infectious 
diseases. The Conferences were integral in the eventual formation of the World Health 
Organization in 1948, the world’s primary international organization for fighting global 
health issues86.  
If my hypothesis holds true, then we would more cooperation when 
consequences are understood. This phenomenon occurred in infectious diseases. There 
was a time when there was no cooperation, and the consequences of infectious diseases 
were not well understood. Nations believed they could solve the issue through 
quarantine alone. Then, when the breadth of the consequences was better understood, 
cooperation became more urgent. In this case, the consequences were the observable 
deaths and the effect on global economies by Cholera.  
 
Climate Change  
Climate change is another analogous area where we see support for the existence 
of a casual mechanism between understanding consequences and cooperation. There is 
a lack of consensus regarding climate change - no one really knows what is going to 
happen. For a lot of people, the effects of climate change do not matter because they 
assume it will not happen to them. They have yet to fully understand the consequences 
and its severity. This is the intergenerational problem; the people who will be most 
affected cannot participate in the decision-making process because they are not born 
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yet. People today cannot understand and believe the consequences, so they are less 
inclined to do something about it. This also resembles uncertainty paralysis: non-action 
or the stoppage of a certain discussion because of uncertainty on an issue.  
The biggest clue that understanding consequences leads to more cooperation 
exists as a result of the 2019-2020 Australia brushfires. The fires have destroyed more 
than 18 million hectares of land, and killed an estimate of a billion animals and over 34 
people87,88. These consequences are real, tangible, observable and understood by the 
people living through them in Australia. The result was an immediate call to action on 
climate change. Nation-wide rallies with attendance in the tens of thousands calling for 
immediate action on climate change started to happen after governmental inaction on 
the issue89. Protestors and scholars alike were explicit in their observed connection 
between climate change and the fires. A professor of climate science at the University of 
Sydney studying the brushfires said “We're probably looking at what climate change 
may look like for other parts of the world in the first stages in Australia at the 
moment”90. With regards to climate change, we have observed shifts in perception for 
the need to cooperate when the consequences become more quantifiable.  
 
In a world where this hypothesis were to be the case, then we would see a higher 
degree of tangibility and understanding correlate to a higher level of cooperation. Thus, 
we would see this clue: 
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Clue 1: An understanding of consequences promotes cooperation, and this is on 
people’s minds at the time91.  
This clue holds strong probative value. If there is evidence that this clue exists, then 
there is strong reason to believe that this hypothesis holds true.92  
 
Nuclear Weapons 
The issue of nuclear weapons proliferation was not discussed internationally 
until after the US dropped two atomic bombs on Japan at the end of World War II. This 
event was the first time that the devastating effects of nuclear weapons was observable 
and made known to the entire world. As soon as they happened, news sources brought 
word of the bombings and destruction to all corners of the world. The total death toll is 
not actually known, but it is estimated that between 60,000 and 80,000 people died 
instantly in Hiroshima, with a total of 135,000 dying after from injuries and long-term 
effects of radiation93. Around 40,000 people reportedly died instantly in Nagasaki, and 
50,000 total people were estimated to have died from injuries and long-term effects of 
radiation94. The high volume of deaths as a result of the nuclear weapons was an 
observable consequence. The world observed these deaths and understood how nuclear 
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92 I will use the same set of clues to analyze both chemical and biological weapons. They appeared on the war scene in tandem, 
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C1. NW. E1. – The consequences of nuclear weapons became universally understood 
after World War II. 
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weapons can wipe out large percentages of cities’ populations. Beyond the deaths, the 
destruction of cities was another observable consequence. In Hiroshima, 61% of the 
city’s buildings were completely burned, and 75.4% of all buildings were at least 
partially destroyed95. In Nagasaki, a third of the city was destroyed96.  
Scholars also conducted scientific studies to better understand the health impacts 
that nuclear weapons have on people. In the Baby Tooth Survey, scientists found 
conclusive evidence that above-ground nuclear testing had severe public health risks. 
The study found that humans were ingesting cancer-causing radioactive isotopes as a 
result of fallout from nuclear testing97. This report, released in 1951, made people very 
aware of the severe consequences that nuclear weapons can have on those who are not 
thought to be directly impacted by them. This danger spurred the US the UK, and the 
USSR to sign the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that banned above ground nuclear 
testing98.  
Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of an anti-nuclear movement 
that was carried out by ordinary citizens around the world. The observed consequences 
of nuclear weapons spurred an activist movement that called for the abolition of nuclear 
weapons in order to protect the peace and safety of the world. The first example is the 
Women Strike for Peace group - a women led group of protests that led marches in 60 
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C1. NW. E2. – An understanding of nuclear weapon’s consequences spurred protest 
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US cities in 196199. The second example is the Aldermaston Marches in the United 
Kingdom. These started in 1958, and drew tens of thousands of people to march against 
nuclear weapons100. Both protest groups called for states to cooperate to abolish the 
weaponization of nuclear energy. 
On a scholarly level, many important political and academic figures called for 
disarmament of nuclear weapons after observing the horrific effects of the bomb. Nobel 
Laureate Bertrand Russel, who was a hallmark of British politics and academia in the 
mid 20th century put out a large amount of literature calling on world governments to 
save the world from the effects of nuclear weapons.   
From The Bomb and Civilization (1945): 
 “The prospect for the human race is sombre beyond all precedent. Mankind are 
faced with a clear-cut alternative: either we shall all perish, or we shall have to acquire 
some slight degree of common sense. A great deal of new political thinking will be 
necessary if utter disaster is to be averted”101 
From the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, written in tandem with Albert Einstein: 
 “All, equally, are in peril, and, if the peril is understood, there is hope that they 
may collectively avert it.”  
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 “It is feared that if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death, sudden 
only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.”102 
As the consequences of nuclear weapons became better understood, world 
government leaders turned to cooperation on disarmament as the only reasonable way 
to avert this peril. This can be shown by a slew of resolutions and draft resolutions 
proposed at the United Nations General Assembly sessions. Starting in 1958, States’ UN 
representatives starting consistently calling for an international treaty or institution to 
solve the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation. By reading the resolutions, it is 
observable that the need for cooperation stemmed from the knowledge of the 
consequences of nuclear weapons.  
GA Draft Resolution A/C.1/L.206 1958 - the first draft resolution on the issue of nuclear 
non-proliferation  
 “Recognizing further that the danger now exists that an increase in the number 
of states possessing nuclear weapons may occur”103  
GA Resolution 1402 - Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests (1959) 
 “desiring to safeguard mankind from the increasing hazards resulting from tests 
of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons,” 
 “Bearing in mind the profound concern evinced by the peoples of all countries 
regarding the testing of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons,”104 
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GA Resolution 1576 - Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons 
(1960) 
 “Recognizing the urgency danger that now exists that an increase in the number 
of States possessing nuclear weapons may occur… and the difficulty of maintaining 
world peace” 
 “Believing in the necessity of an international agreement” 
  “Believing further that, pending the conclusion of such an international 
agreement, it is desirable that temporary and voluntary measures be taken to avoid the 
aggravation of this danger”105  
GA resolution 1578 - Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear tests (1960) 
 “Recognizing further that agreement on the cessation of test of nuclear and 
thermo-nuclear weapons is not only imperative but urgent”106  
The language of these texts shows us that there is a clear peril that needs to be solved. 
The usage of words such as “profound concern” and “dangers” signify that the concern 
was understood. The call for international agreements in Resolutions 1576 and 1578 
show that these concerns heightened the perceived need for cooperation. 
 
Biological and Chemical Weapons  
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World War I was the first time that biological and chemical weapons were used in 
warfare. Before then, there was limited information on their destructive capabilities. 
After the founding of microbiology as a science, people started to become more aware 
of the dangers that biological agents pose to society. The threat that this new 
information carried was the direct push for diplomats to cooperate. The result was two 
declarations that forbid the use of poison and poisoned weapons: The 1874 Brussels 
Declaration and the 1899 Hague Declaration107.  
In World War I, European countries on both sides of the war used various 
biological and chemical weapons as a means of maiming and killing their enemies. The 
following information on causalities, injuries, and damage from these weapons was 
made available and received by the public.  
Chemical weapons  
Chemical weapons caused 1.3 million casualties. Out of those casualties, 100,000-
260,000 were civilians and around 200,000 were deaths108. Even after the war ended, 
people were still feeling their consequences. In 1920 alone, 40,000 civilians and 20,000 
military personnel died from lasting injuries as a result of exposure to chemical 
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weapons109. Here are the types of chemical weapons that were used and their known 
effects:  
Tear Gas110 
Tear gas causes tearing in the eyes and trouble breathing. It was used as a 
weapon but since the symptoms resolved themselves quickly, it was abandoned in 
favor of other deadly chemical weapons.  
Chlorine111  
Chlorine reacts with water in the lungs to form Hydrochloric acid. This acid 
causes coughing, vomiting, and eye irritation. At a more concentrated dose, it causes a 
quick death.  
Phosgene and Diphosgene112 
Phosgene and Diphosgene are liquids that cause suffocation. They are colorless, 
so soldiers did not know they had ingested the poison. The liquid slowly filled their 
lungs and they died a slow painful death over the course of 48 hours.  
Mustard Gas113 
Mustard Gas is a liquid that irritates the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract acting as 
a blistering agent. It also reacts with DNA to cause cell death.  
It is also important to understand the first-hand accounts of these weapons: 
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“You could see where men had clawed at their faces, and throats, trying to get 
breath. Some had shot themselves. The horses, still in the stables, cows, chickens, 
everything, all were dead. Everything, even the insects were dead.”114  
“There staggered into our midst French soldiers, blinded, coughing, chests 
heaving, faces an ugly purple color, lips speechless with agony, and behind them in the 
gas-soaked trenches, we learned that they had left hundreds of dead and dying 
comrades”115  
Beyond physical effects, chemical weapons left psychological scars: 
“For miles around, scared soldiers woke up in the midst of frightful 
pandemonium and put on their masks, only to hear a few minutes later the cry of “All 
safe.” . . . Two or three alarms a night were common. Gas shock was as frequent as 
shellshock”116  
Biological Weapons 
Once these chemical weapons were used, their consequences became more 
tangible and better understood to the world. The same happened with biological 
weapons, on a smaller scale. There were two main biological weapons used during 
World War I: anthrax and glanders. Anthrax is a deadly biological agent that primarily 
infects animals. Humans become infected with anthrax when they come into contact 
with infected animals. The Germans weaponized anthrax and used it to infect livestock 
that was being shipped to the British117. Anthrax is extremely dangerous, it has a 50% 
mortality rate. Glanders is an infection that was also weaponized in order to infect 
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humans through animals - namely horses. Glanders manifests as pulmonary or 
bloodstream infections in humans118. Biological weapons were not used as much as 
chemical weapons were, so their consequences did not induce immediate panic. 
However, microbial research on the effects of biological agents supplemented these 
observable consequences with scientific backing. This gave more reliability to the fact 
that biological agents were a concern.  
Once the consequences of biological and chemical weapons were better 
understood, there was an increased perception of the need for cooperation. As a direct 
response, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was signed. The preamble of the Protocol 
acknowledged the direct link between understanding consequences and a need for 
cooperation: 
“Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general 
opinion of the civilized world”119  
This Protocol banned the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. The 
intent behind the protocol was to ban the use of these weapons in any future wars. The 
intent is justified by the need to avoid the understood humanitarian consequences of 
the two weapons.   
 
                                               
118 “A Brief History of Chemical War.” Science History Institute, May 11, 2015. https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/a-
brief-history-of-chemical-war. 
119 United Nations, Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 17 June 1925, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a54bc07d.html  
C1. BW/CW. E7. – The understanding of consequences of biological and chemical 
weapons precipitated international cooperation. 
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Cyberweapons 
I did not find evidence to support Clue 1 for cyberweapons. Rather, I found the 
opposite – a lack of understanding of consequences for cyberweapons and an 
acknowledgement that it creates an obstacle to cooperation. There have been many 
observed consequences of cyberattacks. These include, but are not limited to, denial of 
service (DoS), file damage, physical damage, ransomware, and data theft. Although 
cyberspace is lawless, the actions such as theft, extortion, and physical damage done in 
cyberspace are comparable to real life crimes. Cyberweapons also impose incredible 
economic externalities on victims. Most of the costs come from cleaning up from an 
attack and building prevention capabilities for the future120. The lack of understanding 
about cyberweapon threats comes from the inability to predict what the future effects 
are. Technology turns over so quickly due to constant innovation. With every new day, 
the world is constantly pushing the frontier of technological innovation. Due to the 
uncertainty about tomorrow’s cyberspace capabilities, we cannot have complete 
information regarding the consequences of cyberweapons. There may be effects that we 
do not know about because they have not been developed yet. Therefore, the breadth of 
consequences is less quantifiable. Given the wide range of cyberweapons, there is also 
uncertainty about the effect that will manifest through a cyberattack. The consequences 
are only felt after the fact, and even then, they are often not realized. 
In 2010, the virus Stuxnet destabilized Iran’s nuclear program by shutting down 
machines that were used to enrich Uranium. The virus, believed to have been 
developed by the US in conjunction with Israel, hacked into the mainframe of Iran’s 
nuclear program. It then took over control of around 1,000 centrifuges that were 
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enriching uranium, and made their motors tear the machines apart from the inside out121. 
This was the first time that the world was really made aware of the capability of 
cyberweapons to infiltrate physical infrastructure. This ability signaled some more 
concrete consequences of cyberweapons to the world. While Stuxnet allowed the world 
to be more aware of the consequences of cyberweapons, it also taught us that we only 
know a fraction of its capabilities. The lack of understanding of threats even after 
examples come to light have been expressed by many countries and international 
institutions.   
Here are some quotes to show that this problem is on people’s minds: 
“There is much uncharted territory in the world of cyber-policy, law and 
doctrine. We can’t tell what has and what hasn’t happened”122 - Keith Alexander, the 
former head of the U.S. Cyber Command 
“With the constant advancements in current technologies comes a new wave of 
security challenges”123- TrendLabs 2015 Report Published by the International 
Telecommunications Union  
“Cybercrime is progressing at an incredibly fast pace, with new trends constantly 
emerging. [We] must therefore keep pace with new technologies, to understand the 
possibilities they create for criminals and how they can be used as tools for fighting 
cybercrime”124 - Interpol  
                                               
121 60 Minutes: Stuxnet (Columbia Broadcasting System, 2012), 
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“The expanding use of ICTs [Information and Communication Technology] in 
critical infrastructures and industrial control systems creates new possibilities for 
disruption”125 - Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 2015 
These public statements by entities well-versed on the issue are evidence that we 
currently do not have full understanding of the consequences of cyberweapons. With a 
lack of understanding comes the inability to make them tangible. How can we make 
consequences tangible if we do not know what they are yet? This sentiment is reflected 
in the steps that the international community is taking to mitigate the issue. Due to the 
iterative nature of this problem, the international community cannot successfully 
cooperate on the issue without having an understanding on what they are cooperating 
on. This is the focus of current international happenings. In the GGE and the OEWG’s 
mandates, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/73/27, the GGE “Decides… to 
continue to study, with a view to promoting common understandings, existing and 
potential threats in the sphere of information security”126. The GGE’s current agenda 
includes informal intersessional consultative meetings with diplomats and experts in 
the field to better understand future threats of cyberweapons.  
Of the 16 countries that submitted preliminary working papers to the OEWG, 10 
dedicated sections to outlining the need and proposed directions for better 
understanding existing and potential threats with a purpose of furthering cooperative 
efforts127. The International Committee of the Red Cross on International Humanitarian 
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Law and Cyber Operations during Armed Conflicts submitted a position paper urging 
the OEWG and GGE to work towards a better understanding of the human cost of 
cyberweapons. The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace also submitted a 
position paper calling for a better understanding of cyberspace norms in order to be 
better prepared for emerging threats128. The word choice of “potential” threats in all of 
these documents, as a distinction from existing, inherently implies the existence of an 
unknown group of consequences. The urging to get closer to a consensus further 
implies that there are threats that are not fully realized.  
Using Mill’s method of difference, I propose that the lack of evidence, and the 
observation of the opposite result in the cyberweapon case study lends support for the 
belief that Hypothesis 1 holds true.  
 
Hypothesis 2: As the attribution of violation becomes harder, 
cooperation becomes less likely 
 
I hypothesize that as the attribution of violation becomes harder, cooperation 
becomes less likely. Attribution refers to the ability to formally identify the user of a 
weapon. An attribution problem, as I call it in the rest of this section, is when attribution 
of a perpetrator is sufficiently difficult that it could realistically not happen. This 
                                               
128 Ibid.  
Given the existence of evidence C1. NW. E1, C1. NW. E2, C1. NW. E3, C1. NW. E4, 
C1. BW. E5, C1. BW/CW. E6, and C1. BW/CW. E7, we have reason to believe that 
Clue 1 exists in our world. Thus, we have strong reason to believe that Hypothesis 1 
holds true. 
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attribution mostly occurs after the use of the weapon. But, I use the word violation to 
mean either the development, stockpiling, or use of the weapon. Attributing the use of 
an illegal weapon to a perpetrator often hinges on verification of treaty non-compliance. 
In the theoretical construct of the world where Hypothesis 2 would be the case, we 
would see this clue manifest:  
Clue 1:  there is acknowledgement of an attribution problem and that its effects pose 
problems for cooperation  
The absence of an attribution problem alone does not give us reason to believe the 
hypothesis holds true. However, the existence of an attribution problem triggers a 
theoretical justification for how the mere existence of those clues strongly implies the 
existence of a cooperation problem. Thus, we can reason that the absence of an 
attribution problem does not trigger that specific cooperation problem. By levying large 
costs on defectors, punishment provisions lower the payoff for non-cooperation. 
However, the effectiveness of punishment provisions relies on the ability to identify a 
violator to punish. In areas where it is difficult to attribute a violator to punish, 
punishments are pointless. It becomes an ineffective way to raise the cooperation payoff 
above the non-cooperative payoff. Thus, an obstacle to cooperation still remains. The 
existence of obstacles to cooperation such as this lower the probability that cooperation 
will be achieved. Conversely, the lack of an attribution problem removes an obstacle to 
cooperation, which increases the probability that cooperation will be achieved.   
The existence of evidence for both parts of Clue 1 plus the theoretical justification 
gives Clue 1 high probative value. The existence of Clue 1 gives us strong reason to 
believe the hypothesis holds in our world.  
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Nuclear Weapons 
I did not find evidence of an attribution problem with nuclear weapons. I also did 
not find evidence that this attribution problem created an obstacle to cooperation. 
Before the NPT, the world had almost complete information on what states had nuclear 
weapons. Today, we continue to have that information, and we also have reliable 
information on what states have the capabilities to build nuclear weapons. Building a 
nuclear weapon is very costly, and many states do not have the money or infrastructure 
to support that endeavor. It also requires importing rare and expensive materials, the 
buying of which can be observed by other states. The existence of near complete 
information on what states are capable of producing and using nuclear weapons, and 
those that stockpile them, provide clues that the attribution is very easy. In a world 
where this hypothesis holds true, that means we would see more cooperation. This 
outcome is evident with the existence of the NPT. 
 
Chemical Weapons 
I did not find evidence of an attribution problem with chemical weapons. There is 
also no evidence that an attribution problem created cooperation obstacles during the 
negotiations of the CWC. Rather, during negotiations, states worked together to avoid 
the attribution problem that plagued the BWC. The attribution of chemical weapons 
hinges on the existence of ex-post evidence. The body of this evidence comes from fact 
finding missions and chemical forensics, which are both available and accessible 
mechanisms129. In response to alleged chemical weapon use in Syria, the UN launched an 
investigation using a balance of independent, impartial on-site fact-finding missions 
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and forensics. The fact-finding team used in depth microbial laboratory studies to 
analyze samples from autopsies of victims of the attacks130. The studies revealed that 
based on unique markets, the chemical gasses used in the attacks were very likely to 
have been made from the same precursor chemicals that came from declared Syrian 
stockpiles. Testimony from scientific exports supported these findings. The results were 
combined with witness statements, on-site investigations, and information collected 
from other states about Syria’s chemical weapon program to make sure the report was 
credible and reliable131,132. The fact-finding mission used well established criminal 
investigation methods to attribute chemical weapon use. The evidence needed to build 
a sound case are relatively easy collect and widely available, thus increasing the chance 
that a fact-finding mission will successfully attribute an attack133. The type of information 
needed to complete contemporary fact-finding missions were available at least twenty-
five years before the CWC went into effect. This proposition is supported by the fact 
that the IAEA was using the same methods for fact-finding twenty-five years before the 
NPT was opened for signature.  
 
Biological Weapons  
                                               
130 Koblentz, Gregory D., and Jonathan B. Tucker. “Tracing an Attack: The Promise and Pitfalls of Microbial Forensics.” 
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C1. BW. E1: Public acknowledgement of the attribution problem for biological 
weapons. 
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It is well acknowledged in academia that biological weapons are hard to detect 
because they are easily accessible and cheap to make. The ingredients of biological 
weapons are often naturally occurring, giving the weapon a plausible deniability 
characteristic. Bio-weapon attacks can easily be covered up as natural outbreaks. 
Ingredients for bio-weapons and the equipment needed to make them can also be easily 
sourced from hospitals or commercial medical supply companies134. The cost of doing 
this is far lower compared to other weapons that require specific infrastructure, 
expensive rare ingredients, high volumes of research, development, and testing135. The 
ease with which biological weapons can be produced do not bar many actors from 
having access to them.  
This attribution problem is also acknowledged by world leaders and decision 
makers. This problem was only recognized after the signing of the BWC. States quickly 
realized that further cooperation was needed create additional protocols in order to 
solve this problem. Thus, the BWC Review Conferences, and other relevant parties, 
since 1986 have been trying to codify more international law solving this issue. :   
“Scientists must be able to determine, first, what was the source of the event that 
caused the disease; second, determine if the event was natural or deliberately caused; 
and third, be able to track down its origins. That is an extremely difficult set of tasks… 
Without good technology, we can’t confirm what happened or even begin the process 
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C1.BW.E2: Acknowledgement that the lack of attribution ability causes an 
enforcement problem by government leaders and decision makers. 
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of determining attribution”136 – Paula A. DeSutter, US Assistant Secretary for 
Verification, Compliance and Implementation 
Assistant Secretary DeSutter linked the attribution problem to the enforcement 
problem: 
  “If we can’t determine who the guilty party is, there can be no consequence for the 
action, and there is nothing to deter more biological events from occurring. There is no 
deterrence value to the agreement… The formula is very simple. State Parties have a 
responsibility to live up to their obligations. If they do not, they deny the other parties 
the benefits of the agreement.”137  
The link between the attribution problem and an enforcement problem was on the 
agenda of the second Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference. One of the 
stated goals of the review conference was:  
 “Confirming the common interest in strengthening the authority and the 
effectiveness of the Convention, to promote confidence and co-operation among State 
Parties,”138  
 This common interest stemmed from the acknowledged attribution problem, which 
rendered the quasi-verification system in Article V ineffective. To fix this problem 
recommended measures to help solve the attribution problem: 
 “The conference, mindful of the provisions of Article V and Article X, and 
determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence in 
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the implementation of its provisions, agrees that the States Parties are to implement, on 
the basis on mutual co-operation, the following measures 
Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of 
activities, on research centers and laboratories that meet very high national or 
international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, 
biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or specialize in 
permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention. 
Exchange of information on all outbreaks of infectious disease and similar 
occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards 
type, development, place, or time of occurrence. If possible, the information provided 
would include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area 
affected, and number of cases. 
Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the 
Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States Parties”139 
 
Cyberweapons 
Cyberweapons are deployed from behind a screen, remotely. A person can carry out 
an attack on an entity from the opposite side of the world, since cyberspace connects all 
technology on the planet. All that one needs to commit a cybercrime is access to 
technology, which makes the pool of potential attackers unfathomably large. This 
presents a large problem with attribution: there are so many potential perpetrators that 
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C1. CY. E3: Public acknowledgement by government leaders and decision makers of the 
cybersecurity attribution problem. 
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it is very hard to identify just one. Technology has advanced in such a way that hackers 
can easily hide their identities and leave no trail. Perpetrators employ tactics to hide 
their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses such as using Virtual Private Networks (VPN) or 
proxy servers. An IP address is the cyber version of your actual address, it identifies 
your location and server used to “host” you140.  Lack of an address that tethers a hacker 
to a specific location allows them to often slip into the void of cyberspace. Code has 
been developed to plant “red flags” that hackers use to lead investigators in the wrong 
direction when tracing an attack back to a source141. The US’s Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) relayed the difficulty of this problem, when trying to answer the 
question of who is behind cyber-attacks. They could be: 
 “computer geeks looking for bragging rights, to businesses trying to gain an upper 
hand in the marketplace by hacking competitor websites, from rings of criminals 
wanting to steal personal information and sell it on black markets, to spies and 
terrorists looking to rob our nation of vital information or launch cyber strikes”142  
Stuxnet is a great example of the attribution problem. Stuxnet’s code is heavily 
encrypted, so the exact perpetrators of the attack have not been identified. All that is 
known is that the worm came from a cyber espionage group called the Equation Group. 
The Equation Group has been able to author code that conceals their identities and 
location. The Kaspersky Lab, the multinational cybersecurity group that found Stuxnet 
and identified the Equation Group has not been able to attribute an allegiance between 
the Equation Group and a country143.  There is intense speculation that Stuxnet was 
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designed in tandem between Israel and the US, however that has not been confirmed. 
The attack on Iran’s nuclear program happened over ten years ago, and there is only 
speculation on the identity of the perpetrators.  
This attribution problem was acknowledged by the GGE in their 2015 report: 
“The malicious use of ICTs can be easily concealed and attribution to a specific 
perpetrator can be difficult, allowing for increasingly sophisticated exploits by actors 
who often operate with impunity”144 
 One of the main goals of the GGE’s 2013 report is to establish the rules on responsible 
state behavior in cyberspace: 
 “Member States have repeatedly affirmed the need for cooperative action against 
threats resulting from the malicious use of ICTs. Further progress in cooperation at the 
international level will require an array of actions to promote a peaceful, secure, open 
and cooperative ICT environment… These include common understandings on the 
application of relevant international law and derived norms, rules and principles of 
responsible behavior of States”145 
 “The potential for the development and the spread of sophisticated malicious tools 
and techniques, such as bot-nets, by States or non-State actors may further increase the 
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risk of mistaken attribution…The absence of common understandings on acceptable 
State behavior with regard to the use of ICTs increases the risk”146 
 The existing fear of mis-attribution is the core of the cyberweapon attribution 
problem. If there is no way to verify the perpetrator, then enforcing any type of 
punishment is incredibly difficult.   
 Using Mill’s method of difference, I propose that the lack of evidence, and the 
observation of the opposite result in the nuclear weapons and chemical weapons case 
studies lend support for the belief that Hypothesis 2 holds true. 
 
Hypothesis 3: When the benefit of the status quo is large enough, 
cooperation becomes less likely 
 
 I hypothesize that when the benefits of the status quo are high enough, 
cooperation becomes less likely. To this paper, the status quo is a world without 
cooperation. If the payoff that an actor derives from non-cooperation, and therefore no 
deviation from the status quo, is higher than the payoff from deviating from the status 
quo, the actor will not cooperate. There are many factors that influence an actor’s payoff 
list, one of the more influential ones being the domestic lobby. Lobbyist groups spend 
billions of dollars every year to push government policy in a certain direction. The 
government-lobby relationship is usually a mutually beneficial partnership where both 
sides receive net positive benefits from entering in the relationship. This quid pro quo is 
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Given the existence of evidence C1. BW. E1, C1. BW. E2, C1. CY. E3 and C1. CY. E4 
we have strong reason to believe that Clue 1 exists in our world. Thus, we have 
strong reason to believe that Hypothesis 2 holds true. 
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influential enough to sway the workings of governments across the world. This 
observation leads me to propose the question: if the benefit the government receives in 
the status quo from lobbying is high enough, would that affect a states’ willingness to 
cooperate on an international level?  
 In a world with perfect information, we would be able to collect evidence that 
show that a specific degree of influence that an industry lobby has on the government 
correlates to a certain degree of cooperation. This intuition constitutes the “clues”.  In 
order to properly test this, there would need to be evidence for traditional weapons of 
mass destruction and cyberweapons. Presently, the type of lobbying we would need to 
see for cyber in order to make a connection between disarmament aims and lobbying 
does not exist publicly. The topic of international disarmament of cyberweapons has not 
been in the public eye for long enough to allow for this relationship to come to fruition. 
In the future, when the possibility that governments will have to give up their use of 
cyberweapons, and thus threatening the proliferation of this weapon in the private 
sector, we will be able to find enough clues to properly assess if this hypothesis holds 
true. In this section, I will lay the groundwork for this argument in hopes of generating 
a theory and creating stepping stones to test it in the future.  
 Disarmament treaties inherently constrain an actor’s actions regarding the treaty 
subject. This is including, but not limited, weapon research and development, testing, 
and manufacturing. Now more than ever, governments are contracting those tasks out 
to private companies. Any state party to a treaty that contracts out defense work to 
private companies will pass on the treaty’s constraints to those contractors. Here is a 
hypothetical example: imagine the US enters into an international treaty where it has to 
limit its stockpile of submarines that carry nuclear weapons. The corporation that 
produces missiles for US submarines, would have to limit or cease production of this 
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missile. The resulting reduction in revenue for the company is contrary to the firm’s 
profit maximizing goals. Therefore, it would oppose the treaty as it is a roadblock too 
maximizing profit. A reasonable course of action would be for the corporation to lobby 
the Senate to not ratify this treaty. Alternatively, the corporation could lobby the 
government to give them lucrative contracts for other defense materials or weapons. If 
the corporation has a strong enough influence on the government, the singular 
corporation could affect how the US engages in foreign policy. The special relationship 
that the firm and the government had in the hypothetical, in addition to its 
consequences, is an example of the military industrial complex (MIC). The MIC is the 
phenomenon that I use to guide my argument for this hypothesis.  
 
The Military Industrial Complex  
The Military Industrial Complex (MIC) is a term first coined by Dwight D. 
Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell from office address. The complex describes a network 
of individuals and institutions that combine a profit motive with the planning and 
implementation of strategic policy147. The network includes the military, the executive 
and legislative branches of government, and defense-related industries. Although there 
is not one agreed upon definition of the phenomena, it is generally agreed that it 
encompasses the alliance between a county’s military establishment and private 
companies in related fields. The MIC tracks the influence that each party has on the 
other. Eisenhower cautioned that certain industries would encourage military policy in 
a way that is not representative of public opinion. More recent scholars have echoed his 
sentiment: we have to be vigilant against the influence of a lobby that pushes for 
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government spending on military in the name of profit148. Corporations are profit-
maximizing actors. Transitively, their motives are inherently concentrated in 
accumulating wealth and minimizing costs.  
Eisenhower identified that the influence of the military industry complex in America 
is very strong. The MIC also holds up in other countries. I do a small case study of the 
MIC in two other parts of the world: Russia and China. Although this is a small sample 
size, these three countries are world leaders in international relations, specifically in 
disarmament. If the MIC holds up in these cases, it supports the reasonability of my 
hypothesis.  
 
The American Military Industrial Complex 
The military industrial complex in the US is most apparent in the act of government 
contracting. Over the past two decades, there has been an increase in American military 
action, spending, and government defense contracting. Most agencies of the US 
Government contract out the bulk of research, development, and production of war 
related items to private businesses. Businesses are awarded government contracts 
through a bidding process, where the contracts are awarded to the businesses that 
“bids” with the lowest cost estimate for the project149.  
From an economic perspective, the relationship between the government and 
industry makes sense. When an economy divides labor tasks and allows certain firms to 
specialize in production of a certain good, the economy is more efficient and can 
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maximize production of goods while minimizing costs150. Government contracting fits 
this model. It is more efficient and cost effective to contract out certain jobs to 
companies that specialize in a service, so that government agencies can focus on their 
specialties. However, the practice of defense contracting has strayed from this model, 
which has prompted intense scrutiny of the industry and military relationship. Scholars 
have touted the idea that abuses of defense contracting is emblematic of unfair 
influence of industry on military policy. I will look at two aspects of this relationship in 
order to evaluate this claim. The first is by looking at defense contracting over the past 
two decades. I will then supplement this by looking at the effect of the industry lobby 
on.  
Defense Contracting from 2000-Present 
The Department of Defense does the most contracting out of all government 
agencies. The defense industry (which I will just call “the industry”) has contributed a 
yearly average of 2.068% of the US’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for all industries 
between FY (fiscal year) 2000 and FY2018. The yearly average output in nominal value 
over this period is 647.33 billion dollars151.  The value of the defense industry to the 
government reaches far beyond dollar amounts. The products the industry produces, 
namely weapons, allows the US to assert itself to both allies and enemies as a world 
military power that is not to be messed with. This intangible value is the benefit that the 
government receives in entering into this relationship with the industry.  
This intangible value added to the government increases during times of war. The 
prime example of this is defense spending post 9/11, and throughout the 2000s. With 
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the start of the war on terror, the US’s journey to assert itself as a world leader in the 
fight against terrorism was concentrated in upping its military spending152. Between 
FY2001 and FY2003, U.S. defense nominal spending went from $432.9 billion to $553.3 
billion. That $120.4 increase was double China’s defense spending in one year. In 2003, 
China spent nominally $62.5 billion on defense, and they remained the second highest 
defense spender after the US. In 2008, at the height of US Involvement in the Middle 
East, defense spending reached its peak. The US spent over $700 billion on defense that 
year. That is four times the next highest spender’s (China) defense spending during that 
year (108.2 billion)153. Out of that $700 billion spent in 2008, over $400 billion was 
contracted out to private companies. Between FY2004 and FY2010, over 215 billion went 
to weapon procurement. Most of that money went to the major defense contractors: 
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics154. 
From FY2000 to FY2017, Department of Defense contracts went from a nominal value of 
$189 billion to $320 billion. In 2008, defense contracting reached a peak of $450 billion. 
Throughout this time, defense contracting constituted roughly 8% of the federal 
budget155.  
As per the aforementioned economic model, these transactions made theoretical 
sense. However, in practice, the huge increase in defense spending and contracting did 
not always make economic sense. One integral example is a 2002 contract between 
Boeing and the Department of Defense. Boeing signed a leasing agreement with the 
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Department of Defense to supply 100 commercial 767 planes to be converted into 
refueling tankers for the conflict in the Middle East. The new 767s would replace the Air 
Force’s current fleet of 410 KC-135Rs and 126 KC-135Es. The leasing agreement totaled 
$26 billion dollars156.  
Mitchell Daniels Jr., director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
released a memo analyzing the deal. In the memo, Daniels stated that actual per unit 
cost of a commercial 767 is $90 million. He calculated that the nominal value of the 
leasing agreement should be approximately $1 billion157. The OMB conducted an 
Economic Service Life Study and a Tanker Requirement Study and found that out of the 
current fleet of over 600 carriers, only 6 would need to be replaced before 2040. The 
current fleet at the time had a total fuel carry capacity of 105 million pounds, whereas 
the new fleet of 767s only had a 103-million-pound capacity158. Daniels made three 
recommendations in a second memo to the Senate based on these findings: 
 (1) Do nothing. The OMB estimated that the costs of maintaining the current fleet 
is an increase of $23 million each year. However, these costs are far smaller than 
spending $26 billion. 
 (2) Buy the planes at face value. It does not make economic sense to spend $25 
billion more than you have to. That excess money could be allocated among the 
department for different uses.  
 (3) Convert the 126 KC-135Es to the KC-135R model. This would cost only $3.2 
billion, still far lower than $26 billion159.  
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The three recommendations highlighted two major problems with the deal. First, 
there was no urgent need for 100 new 767s. The two studies performed by the OMB 
determined that 530 carriers out of the then-current 536 carrier fleet would be 
operational for the next 38 years. Second, it made no economic sense. Congress could 
have saved at maximum $25 billion dollars by not making this deal. These funds could 
go to strengthening weaker parts of the Defense budget, or be allocated to other 
departments that need the funds more. This deal seems like a bad idea and runs 
contrary to how a government should run. Boeing made $26 billion from this deal. At 
the time, the contract was predicted to grow exponentially, and eventually bring the 
manufacturing giant a profit of around $100 billion160. Boeing, as a profit maximizing 
firm would enter into any deal that would bring in an inflated revenue compared to 
their costs.  
The military industrial complex is a two-way beneficial relationship: the value that 
the deal brought to the government therefore would have had to exceed the cost of 
spending $25 billion more than needed in order for it to be worthwhile. One conjecture 
on the US’s benefit is that it felt an updated arsenal of weapons would push them 
towards a military hegemony. It would also give them credibility and an edge in the 
war on terror161. Another conjecture is the benefits that the industry lobby has on 
individual members of government. The individual voting members of the US congress 
receive lobbying money, specifically in the form of campaign donations. They then are 
influenced to vote a particular way that benefits the source of the lobby, which is the 
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weapons industry in this case. In FY2016, the top 100 lobbyists generally spent $289M 
on lobbying and got $262B in contracts in return. For defense and aerospace specifically, 
the median return on investment was $1,120 for every dollar spent lobbying162  
This existing evidence allows shows that the domestic lobby has an effect on 
government weapons policy through the existence of the military industrial complex.  
 
The Military Industrial Complex in Russia 
The military industrial complex in Russia is less convoluted than in the United 
States because most of their defense industry is either state owned, or has direct ties to 
top levels of Russian government. The government of the former Soviet Union operated 
on the principle of Nomenklatura. This was the principle that job opportunities were 
given to those deemed worthy based on a criterion of origin, professional history, 
readiness to fall in line with party orders, and loyalty to their superiors163. The resulting 
de facto class of communist party elites held influential posts in both the government 
and important industries. Although the nomenklatura seemingly died with the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, it has a lasting effect on the distribution of government and 
industry leaders in Russia today. In 2020, nomenklatura has a milder yet still nepotistic 
feel to it. Those who run Russia’s state-owned corporations give a good illustration of 
the Russian political system as a whole.  
Rostec is Russia’s military industry company. The state-owned behemoth 
incorporates over 700 companies and employs over a half a million people. Rostec 
oversees research and development of military technologies, and owns plants where 
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that technology is turned into actual weaponry. Rostec not only monopolized Russia’s 
military industry, but controls a large part of Russia’s civilian industries: mostly 
automobile, airline, and titanium companies. The CEO of Rostec, Sergey Chemezov is a 
member of Vladamir Putin’s inner circle. Rostec merged with Marathon Group 
(pharmaceutical assets), whose co-owner is the son in law of the Russian minister of 
Foreign Affairs164. Typically, vertical mergers happen when the two firms in question can 
create synergies. However, this merger is suspected to be a political grab by the Russian 
government to take state ownership of industries that provide them power and clout on 
the international level. It is also a reflection of the system of patronage that is deeply 
rooted in the Russian government. It is a mutually beneficial relationship, where actors 
act to maximize the utilities of each other, rather than thinking about the social benefit 
to the society as a whole. Disarmament would mean the reduction in business for the 
defense industry, which negatively impacts those in the government who profit off of 
that industry. Therefore, it is easy to postulate that the needs of the defense industry 
influence the decisions of the Russian government when it comes to weapons control 
and disarmament. 
 
The Military Industrial Complex in China 
Due to the centralized nature of the Chinese government, the military industrial 
complex takes a different form than in the United States. Rather than lobbying as the 
fundamental tie between the military and industries, the Chinese government is in the 
process of combining the two through the state controlled Civilian Military Integration 
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(CMI) program. The Chinese government purports that the only way to build a military 
capable of winning informationalized wars is to integrate the military with civilian 
industries. Consolidating industry and military cuts costs and streamlines efficiency, 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes this is the way to increase 
international defense competitiveness165,166.  
One of the main drivers between this consolidation is China's problems with their 
defense budget. The budget is currently not big enough to pay for all of the Peoples' 
Liberation Army's (PLA) development plans. Slow economic growth in China has 
constrained defense spending, and government officials are reluctant to increase budget 
allocation for fears that it would have a negative impact on the economy as a whole. 
CMI is a proposed solution to this resource constraint. It plans to eliminate any overlap 
in research and manufacturing between different industries and the military. The 
military and relevant industries will overlap and share technology, research, 
development, logistics, training, and all their associated costs. The CCP hopes to 
broaden the base from which the PLA draws funding from by integrating its supply 
chain into its industry. By cutting costs, China plans to increase their output and profit 
gains, mostly in the defense and technology industries167.   
This plan, while driven by economic factors, hands over control of civilian industries 
to the CCP. The elimination of a wholly civilian sector gives the defense sector more 
power and influence. Their research, development, and most importantly, policy 
proposals will have a great effect on the PLA’s policy because it is going to be the base 
from which they get their funding, equipment, and technology. Technological 
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advancement in order to beat technological challenge or warfare is the goal of the PLA. 
Therefore, achieving their goal relies on the defense industry which has the power to 
influence that policy in turn168.   
This relationship will create synergies, but can have an effect when it comes to 
cooperation. Like Russia, the symbiosis between the industry and the military makes it 
so a negative effect on one negatively effects the other. This would prime the 
government to consider the defense industry when making decisions that affect their 
military and through that, their military power. China has already received 
international scrutiny for abusing cyberspace, especially the theft of intellectual 
property. When it comes time to enter into cyber disarmament cooperation, it will be 
important to consider how the CMI initiative affects the government's willingness to 
disarm their share of cyberspace.  
The relationship that is a product of the military industrial complex is going to be 
important to consider in the future. Once we obtain more information in the future, I 
implore political scientists to test the reasonability of this hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4: As the tactical value of a weapon increases, cooperation 
becomes less likely 
 
I hypothesize that as the tactical value of a weapon increases, cooperation becomes 
less likely. Conversely, as the tactical value of a weapon decreases, cooperation becomes 
more likely. The intrinsic value that a country assigns to a weapon brings to a country 
can affect the payoff structure for international cooperation. This begs the question: if 
the value of a weapon is sufficiently high, does that affect the cooperative outcome? I 
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measure the tactical value of a weapon by equating the tactical value of a weapon with 
the benefit that the weapon gives to a country’s strategy. In Appendix 1, I further detail 
and justify my methodology for measuring the tactical value of a certain weapon. In the 
theoretical construct where this hypothesis was to be the case, then we would see this 
clue: 
Clue 1: net positive payoff (tactical value) and existence of relevant obstacles to 
cooperation   
To find this evidence, I use a set of guiding principles that is found in Appendix 1. 
The tactical value of the weapon alone has low probative value. I thus look for evidence 
regarding the existence of cooperation problems. That also has a standalone low 
probative value. However, the two pieces of evidence together have probative value, 
and I can use that to determine if we have reason to believe this hypothesis holds true.  
 
Nuclear Weapons 
 Deterrence Value 
In most cases, the reason a country stockpiles a weapon is so the country can deploy the 
weapon during a time of conflict. Nuclear weapons are different in that the bulk of their 
value comes from their status as a deterrent. Nuclear weapons were used twice in 1945, 
and not once again for the next 75 years. Even at the height of the cold war, neither the 
USSR nor the US, the two world leaders in nuclear stockpiles, detonated a nuclear 
weapon for any reason besides testing. As parity among nuclear weapon states was 
achieved, the use of nukes was deterred via the principle of mutually assured 
destruction (MAD). MAD is based off of the fear of retaliation. If a state attacked 
another country with nuclear weapons, that country, or its allies, would use nuclear 
weapons in retaliation.  MAD was simplified into: whoever shoots first, dies second. 
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The annihilation from the exchange of nuclear weapons is a consequence so large that it 
almost renders the weapon unusable169. Looking through the lens of deterrence, there are 
substantial benefits to holding nuclear weapons.  
 
Value of Use 
The benefits of deploying nuclear weapons are extremely low compared to the costs 
that the ensuing nuclear winter would cause. The costs of mutual annihilation are far 
greater than the costs of remaining in the status quo, regardless of the state of nature. A 
nuclear winter, as some scientists suspect, would have harmful impacts on the world 
for up to millennia after the attack170. The fear of one’s population suffering from 
retaliatory attacks deters a country from using their nuclear weapons in the first place. 
In considering the value a weapon has to a country’s arsenal, it is important to consider 
the frequency with which the weapon is used to achieve policy goals. MAD makes it so 
that the chances of nuclear weapons being launched are near zero. The value of a 
weapon, when only quantifying the ability to use it, would be low if the conditions of 
the world make it so it cannot be used.  
In a scenario in which nuclear weapons are used, there are severe humanitarian, 
environmental, infrastructure, and public health externalities. The consequences, shown 
in Hypothesis 1, result in the elimination of human and animal life, infrastructure, and 
livable land. The understanding of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons 
created an international taboo against their use that is deeply entrenched in society. On 
top of the destructive physical consequences the use of nuclear weapons would incur, 
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users of nuclear weapons would face harsh sanctions are penalties from other countries. 
These consequences are of the likes of the arms bans and economic embargo on Iran. 
The effects of the embargo have seeped beyond just punishing the Iranian government. 
The embargo has had a negative impact on the Iranian economy, which 
disproportionately effects those who are from rural, low income areas. As a part of the 
sanctions, Iran’s ability to use foreign assets was frozen, which has consequently 
disabled Iran from seeking international aid to purchase necessary medicines171. Many 
have called this a humanitarian crisis, as there is a shortage of access to live-saving 
drugs.  
 
Cost - Benefit Analysis  
When looking at the big picture effects of stockpiling and using nuclear weapons, 
the costs far outweigh the benefits. It is hard to find any substantial benefit to using a 
nuclear weapon beyond retaliatory deterrence. When weighing that benefit against the 
costs, I assign nuclear weapons a negative net payoff. Therefore, I conclude that this 
weapon has no tactical value172.  
 
Cooperative Outcome 
A high level of cooperation was achieved for nuclear weapons. This is emblematic in 
the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The confirmed nuclear weapon states did not have to give 
up their stockpile of nuclear weapons under the NPT. To appease non-nuclear weapon 
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states, the confirmed nuclear weapon states agreed to non-proliferation and sharing of 
nuclear energy research for peaceful use. The ability of this compromise to be reached, 
and the sustained cooperation on both the IAEA and NPT show high levels of 
cooperation without obstacles stemming from incentives to defect.  
 
Chemical Weapons  
Deterrence Value  
Historians theorize that the reason chemical weapons were never used in World 
War II was because of their property as a deterrence. There was mass development and 
stockpiling of chemical weapons in the periods between the first and second world 
wars among world powers. The parity of chemical weapon ownership increased fears 
of retaliation. This is a positive benefit for chemical weapons. However, it is a small 
benefit, because the landscape of war has shifted away from that which called for 
chemical weapons. This change is discussed in the next section.   
 
Value of Use  
The initial impetus for the mass development of chemical weapons during World 
War I was their ability to break stalemates during trench warfare. Chemical weapons 
were valuable due to a lack of conventional ammunition and the inability of 
conventional weapons to allow one side to get leverage over the other on the 
battlefield173. The psychological fear induced by chemical weapons also enhanced the 
effects of traditional weapons. After the style of warfare shifted away from trench 
warfare, the initial conditions under which chemical weapons were useful no longer 
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existed174. Today, there is not a lack of ammunition that would create a need for a 
chemical weapon. The existence of gas masks also renders chemical weapons 
ineffective. Chemical weapons offered a benefit for close range warfare. Now, since 
wars can be fought from afar, using technology such as drones and inter-continental 
ballistic missiles, the strategic value of chemical weapons is diminished. There are little 
to no benefits of having chemical weapons in a military arsenal for potential 
deployment.  
There is international consensus that it is socially taboo to use chemical weapons. 
This norm incentivizes states to punish users of chemical weapons, whether it be with 
an actual sanction, or making that violator into a pariah. Humanitarian concerns 
kickstarted the campaign against the use of chemical weapons. It is a weapon that 
causes unnecessary psychological and mental pain and suffering. The impetus for 
cooperation to ban chemical weapons was to ban states from being able to use the cruel 
method as a way of gaining the upper hand during war. The reactions to the use of 
chemical weapons proves more consequential to a state than the benefits from its use in 
terms of policy outcomes.  
 
Cost – Benefit Analysis 
These clues give me support to assign a negative net payoff to chemical weapons. 
The strategic value of the weapon has sufficiently diminished due to a shift in the 
conditions of war away from one that made it a useful weapon. The consequences of the 
using the weapon outweigh the benefit of stockpiling and using the weapon due to low 
deterrence value. When weighing that benefit against the costs, I assign chemical 
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weapons a negative net payoff. Therefore, I conclude that this weapon has no strategic 
value.  
 
Cooperative Outcome 
Although the negotiations of the CWC took a long time, this is not emblematic of 
problems stemming from incentives to defect. Rather, the prolonged nature was 
because there was a general consensus among states to avoid that these obstacles 
needed to be avoided. The existence of the CWC and OPCW and their relative success 
in prohibiting the proliferation of chemical weapons is emblematic of high levels of 
cooperation with no problems stemming from incentives to not cooperate.  
 
Biological Weapons  
Deterrence Value 
Biological weapons do not have a value as a deterrent. For it to have value as a 
deterrent, states would have to make public their stockpiling of biological weapons and 
use it to make credible threats. This would never happen, because biological weapons 
threaten large populations of people175. There is such a strong international taboo against 
the use of biological agents used to purposely infect humans that states have historically 
only developed these weapons in secret. 
 
Value of Use  
Biological weapons are attractive due to the ease with which they can proliferate. 
First, the ingredients for bio-weapons are easily accessible. Anthrax can be found in 
                                               
175 “Deterrence, without Nuclear Winter.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 9, 2015. 
https://thebulletin.org/2015/03/deterrence-without-nuclear-winter/. 
 
 
 
83 
 
nature, as it is a naturally occurring bacteria. The equipment needed to make a 
bioweapon double as basic medical research equipment. Both agents and the equipment 
needed can be bought easily from commercial medical supply companies. Biological 
weapons are also relatively cheap to make - they are referred to as the “poor man’s 
atomic bomb”. For comparison, North Korea is estimated to have spent between $18 
million to $53 million on each individual nuclear warhead176. Comparatively, one 
assessment puts the cost of producing one military grade biological weapon at less than 
$100,000. Such program requires five biologists and take just a few weeks using 
equipment that is readily available177. This scenario resembles a more “sophisticated” 
biological weapons program, which implies that they could be made at an even lower 
cost. This implication is supported by the ability of individuals and small groups to gain 
access to biological weapons (anthrax and salmonella).  
Another pro of biological weapons is their ability to inflict damage without killing 
humans. One aspect of biological weapons is their ability to destroy an enemy’s 
infrastructure. In World War II, Japan released diseased insects on China’s rice fields, 
one of their main sources of food. There is evidence that the USSR’s biological weapons 
program dedicated a considerable amount of research to weapons that could destroy an 
enemy’s food supply, economy, and morale. Strong infrastructure supports strong 
nations178. A country that wants to weaken an enemy can use biological weapons to 
strategically debilitate the foundations with which a nation stands on. This threat is 
very real because of advances in biology, especially in gene-editing techniques. 
                                               
176 Blumberg, Yoni. “Here’s How Much a Nuclear Weapon Costs.” CNBC, August 8, 2017. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/08/heres-how-much-a-nuclear-weapon-costs.html. 
177 “CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: 
THE POOR MAN'S BOMB.” Federation Of American Scientists. Accessed April 5, 2020. https://fas.org. 
178 Frischknecht, Friedrich. “The History of Biological Warfare: Human Experimentation, Modern Nightmares and Lone 
Madmen in the Twentieth Century.” EMBO Reports 4, no. S1 (June 2003). doi:10.1038/ 
 
 
 
84 
 
Advances in black biology, the diversion of gene manipulation for harmful purposes, 
have given scientists the ability to weaponize infections in a more efficient way179. Black 
biology can be used to increase the virulence and potency of a pathogen. This is a very 
terrifying reality, but adds incredible valuable for biological weapons. In 2020, COVID-
19 has tanked the global economy and, left millions of people without jobs, homes, and 
incomes. With the existence of black biology and the right motive, scientists could 
realistically replicate this virus into a weapon with global consequences180.  
Outbreaks of infectious diseases can be made to look like natural outbreaks. This 
gives biological weapons a plausible deniability effect and thus are harder to attribute 
to an attacker, as found in Hypothesis 2. The Soviet Union’s biological weapons 
program accidentally released anthrax into a small town. They were not held 
accountable because they successfully covered it up as a natural outbreak due to tainted 
meat. Biological weapons, because of the aforementioned characteristics, are valuable to 
countries that do not have nuclear weapons181. This type of weapon is seen as an 
equalizer, that would put them on a more level playing field with countries that have 
military superiority.  
There is a seemingly extensive list for why biological weapons have high strategic 
value to a country. Its ability to inflict high levels of damage at a low cost with the 
protection of plausible deniability gives it high value as an addition to a country’s 
nuclear stockpile. However, it is important to note that the value derived from these 
weapons can only be collected if they are deployed. There widely believed international 
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norm against the use of biological weapons. This norm is that using biological weapons 
is immoral and inhumane. The vast acceptance of this norm is an effective deterrence 
for its use. Adherence to the norm is rationale for states severely punishing violators. 
States would be expected to turn a violator into a Pariah, and reject it publicly. The 
shame of violating an international humanitarian norm would hurt this country’s 
credibility and could affect cooperation with that country in the future. If the violator 
was found to be diverting biological research for harmful use using new technology, it 
could potentially lose the ability to use new technology in the future. This harms 
dynamic innovation, which can cause the country to lag behind other countries that 
have high levels of innovation and research.  
I have mentioned that plausible deniability reduces the chances of being linked to an 
attack. However, this characteristic does not completely protect a country from being 
found out, it just reduces their chances. In 2018, a former Russian military officer and 
his daughter were in England. They were double agents for Russian and British 
intelligence. Russia was suspected of carrying out the attempted assassination to punish 
them. Russia denied this claim. Regardless, England used textual clues and a criminal 
investigation to build a pretty compelling case against Russia. As a result, England and 
28 other countries expelled 153 Russian diplomats from the country. Since, the 
relationship between England and Russia has been strained182,183. This situation is an 
example of the strength of the international norm against the use of biological weapons. 
Even though Russia was not attributed, plausible deniability does not protect actors 
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completely, especially in an age of espionage. Knowing the type of reaction countries 
could have against violators is a deterrent.  
Another cost of using biological weapons is that pathogens do not respect borders. If 
a country chose to use a biological weapon against an enemy, there is no guarantee that 
the biological agent would not spread to other countries, including the perpetrator’s 
own. This is widely believed to be the reason that Germany did not use biological 
weapons in World War II. There is also evidence that Japan accidentally infected over 
1,000 of its own during biological attacks on China184. Unpredictable winds, changing 
terrain, and movement across borders makes this fear plausible. This is an extreme risk 
that some countries are not willing to take, when also considering the costs of being 
attributed to the attack and punished.  
 
Cost – Benefit Analysis  
Biological weapons have a high value stemming from their low cost, plausible 
deniability effect, and low difficulty to build. However, they are rarely used and have 
no value as a deterrence. They also have an incredibly strong taboo against their use, 
which would result in harsh consequences if a biological weapons user is identified. 
When weighing the costs and benefits, I assign a net neutral payoff to biological 
weapons. This corresponds to no tactical value.  
 
Cooperative Outcome  
The BWC was opened for signature only two years after negotiations started. The 
UK and the US purported that biological weapons posed a less intractable problem than 
                                               
184 Frischknecht, Friedrich. “The History of Biological Warfare: Human Experimentation, Modern Nightmares and Lone 
Madmen in the Twentieth Century.” EMBO Reports 4, no. S1 (June 2003). doi:10.1038/ 
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chemical weapons, while still carrying a very serious threat. This stems from the fact 
that although many world powers developed and stockpiled biological weapons, they 
were rarely used. This sentiment was widely accepted, and an agreement was reached 
with few roadblocks to cooperation. This is reflective of a high level of cooperation.  
 
Cyberweapons 
 To assess the tactical value that a cyberweapon has, I will be considering 
cybercapabilities more generally. Cybercapabilities is the more general category under 
which cyberweapons fall, and are often used to characterize a country’s cyberweapon 
arsenal. The definition of a cybercapability that I will be using is “a capability designed 
to access a computer system or network to damage or harm living or material entities”185. 
It is important to think about this more generally, because a cyberweapon does not 
constitute one specific type of weapon. Rather, the customization of cyberspace to 
replicate a variety of weapons or other actions that a military could use in real life.  
 
Deterrence Value  
A cyberweapon can be used as a deterrent. The threat of punishment via a 
cyberweapon can be used to dissuade an adversary from escalating conflict. 
Cyberweapons can also be written so that their effect is reversible. The promise to 
reverse an effect if the target takes a certain action is also a credible form of coercion. 
However, information sharing within the IT community creates parity in 
cybercapabilities and makes it harder to build effective weapons. In this condition, a 
cyberweapon loses its ability to deter. 
                                               
185Smeets, Max, and Herbert S. Lin. “Offensive Cyber Capabilities: To What Ends?” In 2018 10th International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 55–72. Tallinn: IEEE, 2018. doi:10.23919/CYCON.2018.8405010. 
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 Value of Use  
The most well-understood value of a cyberweapon is its flexibility. A cyberweapon 
uses code to create an action that would otherwise have to be done with soldiers, kinetic 
weapons, or spies. Therefore, it is not limited to the same physical constraints. To act, an 
actor does not need to be in a specific location. To build and deploy a cyberweapon, an 
actor only needs the right technology and access to a network. The ability to remotely 
“detonate” a cyberweapon gives a lot more flexibility for its use. Another advantage of 
such a malleable weapon is that it can be coded and designed to fit very specific goals. 
This is beneficial for two specific reasons. First, the code for a cybercapability can be 
written with extreme precision so that it attacks a specific target. The ability to 
distinguish between a target and non-combatants, unlike most WMD, limits the number 
of civilian casualties. It also limits the risk involved to the personnel who “delivers” the 
attack. These personnel are safer sitting behind a computer screen than flying over a 
war-zone and dropping a bomb186.  
Cyberweapons move war into an intangible platform, which gives the weapon an 
extremely covert nature. The secretive nature of a cybercapability limits the exposure 
that the actor has to the target. Espionage is a very common form of cybercapabilities 
because it allows the actor to act as a burglar for information without actually having to 
go somewhere and steal it. This makes it harder for the target, or third parties, to 
identify the perpetrator of the attack. This reduces the risk that the perpetrator will be 
caught and subsequently punished. When weighing the costs and benefits of a certain 
method of action, knowing the chances of being caught and punished are low, 
incentivizes an actor to choose that outlet. Another value derived from covertness is the 
                                               
186 George Perkovich and Ariel Levite, Understanding Cyber Conflict: 14 Analogies (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
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ability to use a cyberweapon as a form of non-public coercion. Cyber operations do not 
need to be exposed publicly. An actor can use a cyberweapon and then threaten to 
expose the target’s vulnerability to the public. If the actor does not expose this, then the 
target can carry on without the public knowing that another actor has exploited a 
vulnerability in their system. This capability allows cyber actions to be a strong credible 
threat that can de-escalate conflict187.  
Cybercapabilities have many defensive purposes. Malware can be written to initiate 
both pre-emptive and preventative strikes. Nitro Zues is a US designed malware that 
intended to disable Iran’s air defenses. Though never used, Nitro Zeus was a pre-
emptive attack option as a result of the imminent threat that Iran’s nuclear program 
carried188. Stuxnet, which was used, derailed the threat of an Iranian nuclear attack by 
destroying physical inputs for Iran’s nuclear program. This is an example of the 
preventative capabilities of a cyberweapon. Cybercapabilities are also extremely cheap 
compared to other weapons. This makes it an attractive weapon for countries that don’t 
have the money or resources to build large military arsenals. To put this into 
perspective, a one-hour denial of service attack can cost as low as $38189. One nuclear 
warhead supposedly costed North Korea $18-$53 million dollars190. There are relatively 
few inputs needed to build a cyberweapon. The main input is labor, but the skills 
needed to create a cyberweapon are highly transferrable, so labor is a cheap input. 
Cybercapabilities also benefit from the shared experiences effect. As more malwares are 
                                               
187 Smeets, Max, and Herbert S. Lin. “Offensive Cyber Capabilities: To What Ends?” In 2018 10th International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict (CyCon), 55–72. Tallinn: IEEE, 2018. doi:10.23919/CYCON.2018.8405010. 
188 Ibid.  
189 “Price of Website Disabling DDoS Attacks Fall to US$38 per Hour as Botnets Proliferate in China, Vietnam | South China 
Morning Post.” Accessed April 5, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/article/1820464/price-website-disabling-ddos-
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190 Blumberg, Yoni. “Here’s How Much a Nuclear Weapon Costs.” CNBC, August 8, 2017. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/08/heres-how-much-a-nuclear-weapon-costs.html. 
 
 
 
90 
 
coded, the process to build one becomes standardized. There is a lot of information 
sharing within the IT community, so it is not hard to find specific codes. It takes less 
time, effort, and money to write new codes, because many code writers just build off 
already existing malwares191. This also adds to the adaptability value of a cyberweapon - 
they can be customized to fit any nature of attack or any goal.  
There are a handful of aspects that detract from the value that the aforementioned 
characteristics provide. The biggest is the transitory nature of cyberweapons192. The 
constant development of cybercapabilities means that a weapon can only be effective 
for a short amount of time. A weapon only has temporary access to a computer system 
or network to cause damage, which inherently limits its destructive capabilities. Once 
the weapon is used, the target builds defenses against that particular attack. This 
renders the weapon effectively useless. There needs to be even more development of 
new weapons, which racks up time and costs, in order to stay ahead of the curve and 
create useful weapons. A byproduct of this is that there is more parity in 
cybercapabilities. It is a cheap weapon to build, and many of the inputs are easily 
accessible. This gives actors the means to build strong defensive cybercapabilities that 
can protect against attacks193. Cyberweapons are not as effective in deterring adversary 
action as other kinetic weapons such as traditional WMD. It also means cyberweapons 
are not as effective in compellence, because a parity in cybercapabilities lowers the 
credibility of using a cyberweapon as a threat. Parity also limits swaggering. 
Swaggering is the ability to use the ownership of a weapon to display a country’s might 
and power. Cyberweapons have a non-material ontology and often cannot be “showed 
                                               
191 “How Much Does a Cyber Weapon Cost? Nobody Knows.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed April 5, 2020. 
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off”194. It also seems less impressive, or threatening, if there is more cyberweapon parity 
between countries. 
 
Cost – Benefit Analysis 
Cybercapabilities offer a flexible, cheap, multipurpose, precise and covert weapon 
option. Although there are some drawbacks, those conditions also spur more 
technological development, which could be seen as a positive. Therefore, I conclude 
that cyberweapons have a net positive payoff. This corresponds to positive tactical 
value. This supports the existence of clue 1, with low standalone probative value. 
 
Cooperative Outcome 
In the lens of this Hypothesis, I surmise that cyberweapons are too valuable to a 
country to incentivize cooperation. Currently, there is limited cooperation to regulate 
cyberweapons. While there is agreement that this is something that needs to be done 
and can be done in international law, the conditions for successful cooperation have not 
been met. This is reflective of a low level of cooperation due to obstacles to cooperate. 
This supports the existence of clue 1, with low standalone probative value. 
Here are the overall results for Hypothesis 4.  
 Tactical Value Cooperation Problem 
Nuclear  
Weapons No No 
Chemical 
Weapons No No 
Biological 
Weapons No No 
Cyber  
Weapons Yes Yes 
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The existence of evidence for positive tactical value and cooperation problems in 
the cyberweapons case supports the existence of clue 1. The existence of clue 1 gives me 
reason to believe that Hypothesis 4 holds true. The lack of tactical value and existence of 
no related cooperation problems for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons further 
supplements that we have reason to believe this hypothesis is the case. This proposition 
is justified through Mill’s method of difference.  
 
Section VII – Conclusion  
 
Findings 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
C1. NW. E1, C1. NW. E2, C1. NW. E3, C1. NW. E4, C1. BW. E5, C1. BW/CW. E6, and 
C1. BW/CW. E7 supports the existence of Clue 1. Clue 1 has high probative value. The 
lack of evidence and the opposite outcome in the cyberweapons case study supplement 
this value. Thus, it gives me strong reason to believe this hypothesis holds true. 
Hypothesis 2: 
C1. BW. E1, C1. BW. E2, C1. CY. E3 and C1. CY. E4 supports the existence of Clue 1. 
Clue 1 has high probative value. The lack of evidence and the opposite outcome in the 
nuclear weapons and chemical weapons case studies supplement this value. Thus, it 
gives me strong reason to believe this hypothesis holds true. 
Hypothesis 4: 
I found evidence that supports both halves of clue 1 in the cyberweapons case. Clue 
1 has probative value. The lack of evidence and the opposite outcome in the nuclear 
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weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons case studies supplement this 
value. Thus, it gives me reason to believe this hypothesis holds true. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 have high probative values, and thus give us strong reason to 
believe these hypotheses are the case in our world. Hypothesis 4 relies on low probative 
value collected evidence. With the addition of theoretical justifications that I defend in 
Appendix 1, I conclude that Hypothesis 4 has probative value. Thus, we have reason to 
believe this hypothesis is also the case in our world. Given reasonable belief that 
Hypotheses 1,2, and 4 are the case, I believe that these three things affect cooperation on 
international security issues: 
(1) The degree to which consequences of a weapon are understood 
(2) The attribution problem that the weapon poses 
(3) The level of tactical value of the weapon 
Hypothesis 3 represents a limitation that I faced. When thinking about the clues I 
would need to see to support a belief in this hypothesis, I recognized that those did not 
yet exist in the world. Rather than assign low probative value to these clues and try to 
piece together a loose argument, I focus on hypothesis generation. The issue of 
cyberspace generally is one that will take many years to tackle, since it is both relatively 
new, and changing as technology advances. I believe in the future, there will exist clues 
with high probative value and sufficient evidence to support them. I contribute a 
unique stepping stone to better understanding cooperation with the generation of 
Hypothesis 3’s theory. 
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Implications 
 
After coming to these conclusions, I bring attention back to my research question: 
why do states cooperate on some security issues and not others? When I set out to 
answer this question, I wanted to use my findings to understand why cooperation on 
cybersecurity continues to pose a challenge. I have found evidence that a lack of 
understanding cyberweapon consequences, a large attribution problem, and a high 
level of tactical value are all creating obstacles to international cooperation on certain 
issues. I believe that these three challenges are affecting the cooperative payoff structure 
for states. More specifically, each individual problem compounds to make the non-
cooperative payoff higher than the cooperative payoff. This situation is metaphorically 
reflective of the prisoner’s dilemma. Although all states would be better off cooperating, 
their individual preferences are to not cooperate. The “cooperative game” ends in a 
world without cooperation, because all actors select the not-cooperate strategy. When 
no one cooperates, each actor receives the lowest possible payoff. This is because the 
individual non-cooperative payoff hinges on the assumption that other states will 
cooperate, and non-cooperators will get to free ride off of those benefits. However, 
when no actor cooperates, there are no benefits and everyone is made worse off. 
We are seeing this play out in real life. In order to avoid the non-cooperative 
outcome, the individual cooperative payoff needs to be higher than the non-cooperative 
payoff. As aforementioned, my findings indicate that the state of the world is making 
the non-cooperative payoff sufficiently high. Thus, I believe that cooperation will hinge 
on taking measures to lower the non-cooperative payoff sufficiently below the 
cooperative payoff. 
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Recommendations 
 
Unfortunately, a big factor in changing the payoff structure relies on time. 
Cyberspace is an issue that we are collecting new information on every single day. It is 
like building a puzzle without looking at the box. As we find individual pieces that fit 
together, we get a better sense of what the bigger picture might be. However, only time 
will be able to help us complete the puzzle and see the full picture. Once we see the full 
picture, we will have a better sense of exactly what we need to do to cooperate. 
Although the prognosis of “wait it out” seems grim, there are steps that can be taken 
to shorten the duration of time. This is where my paper makes the biggest contribution. 
Cyberweapons are not that different than traditional weapons of mass destruction. A lot 
of the characteristics of cyberweapons that increase its non-cooperative payoff existed 
and have subsequently been avoided in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
cooperation. Cybersecurity decision makers should use these three weapon case studies 
to figure out what actions they can take to limit the cooperative obstacles they face. 
Specifically, here are two preliminary steps that decision makers can take: 
(1) Share information globally to better understand the issue. This can be helpful in two 
areas: 
(A) Understanding the consequences of cyberweapons. International lawmakers 
should establish a forum for different world actors to exchange information on known 
consequences. One feature of this forum should be a database of all known 
consequences. As new consequences emerge, world leaders should be pressured to 
share that information with the database. 
(B) Creating technology to solve the attribution problem. International lawmakers 
should create a streamlined process for sharing open-source information in an effort to 
create technology that can help identify perpetrators of cyberattacks. 
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(2) Work to promote an international taboo against the unregulated use of cyberspace. 
Despite the incomplete nature of the information the world has, there is still enough to 
warrant concern. International decision makers should work to build acceptance of the 
norm that unregulated use of cyberspace is harmful to all people.  with the hopes that it 
pressures relevant actors to cooperate with more urgency. 
As mentioned before, this is a problem that will not be solved for a while. A better 
understanding of the reasons why can help shorten this time period. By taking a 
comparative approach, I believe my findings provide a unique perspective that can help 
decision makers reach sufficient levels of international cooperation.  It is important that 
relevant parties keep contributing to this conversation. We are all worse off with 
unregulated cyberspace, whether we are playing the cooperation game, or just 
observing. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Each country’s government, especially their executive or military branches, place 
intrinsic values on ownership of different types of weapons. For some, this value may 
be greater than the value (payoff) that they receive from cooperating to regulate this 
weapon. It is difficult to quantify the exact value that an object, or a class of objects, has. 
Most attempts to do this rely on monetary assessments. For example, the US 
Government Accountability Office conducts weapon system analyses every year to 
assess the monetary value of military weapons. I have created an innovative and 
original way to assess tactical value that does not involve monetary costs. I assess the 
value of a weapon by evaluating the characteristics of each of the weapons. The 
characteristics are found using a guiding set of principles that intuitively would be 
reasons to or to not invest in the weapon. I conceptualize value as the net benefits that 
ownership of a weapon incurs on the specific country.   
 
Assumptions:  
(1) the existence of tactical value lowers incentives to cooperate by increasing the 
payoff to not cooperate. Non-cooperating would mean retaining the benefits of 
having the weapon in some capacity. Cooperating would mean limiting or 
completely erasing the benefits of having the weapon in some capacity.  
(2) Negative net payoff concludes no tactical value. There cannot be anything less 
than no tactical value.  
(3) There is a whole range of tactical value that the weapon can have. Each level 
correlates to a certain degree of effect on cooperation. For the sake of simplicity, I 
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assume that either tactical value exists and thus hinders cooperation or it does 
not exist and incentivizes cooperation.  
Steps  
(1) Find attributes of having the weapon at your disposal  
(2) Assign each one to be a pro (benefit) or con (cost)  
(3) Do a cost benefit analysis to figure out if that weapon has a net positive payoff or 
a net negative payoff195 
(4) If net positive, then we conclude tactical value  
(5) If net negative, then we conclude no tactical value  
 
Guiding attributes 
(1) If the weapon were to not be used, is there value in stockpiling? 
If the weapon were to be used… 
(2) What are the chances of attribution and punishment? 
(3) Is there an international taboo against the use of the weapon that would 
incentivize punishment?196 
(4) Is it multipurpose? 
(5) Is it cost effective? 
(6) Would another weapon be better suited for achieving the same goal? 
 
 
                                               
195 This is done in a vacuum, not in a strategic setting where the payoff depends on what others do.  
196 The time frame for the existence of an international taboo is before international cooperation 
